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ANTI-ZIONISM AS RACISM: CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM AND
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Kenneth L. Marcus*
INTRODUCTION
The recent resurgence of anti-Semitic incidents at American colleges and uni-
versities' has revealed a significant ambiguity in anti-discrimination law and raised
questions regarding the scope of prohibited racial and ethnic discrimination in Ameri-
can educational institutions. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "1964 Act")
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in federally
funded programs or activities, including most public and private universities but
does not explicitly prohibit religious discrimination.2 Since anti-Semitism may be
based on ethnic, racial, or religious animus, the question arises as to whether anti-
Semitism is covered and to what extent. Recent high-profile incidents of alleged anti-
Semitic behavior on American college campuses have focused attention on this ques-
tion and on the efforts of federal agencies to answer it. The issue is complicated by
the politically charged atmosphere in which these incidents arise, in which alleged
harassment is often closely connected to speech activities relating to matters of signifi-
cant public import, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
* Staff Director, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. The author was previously delegated
the authority of Assistant Secretary of Education for Civil Rights. Some of the materials in this
Article were presented at Columbia University, the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor,
Boston College, Wayne State University, the Congressional Working Group on Human Rights
and Religious Freedom, and in seminars conducted by the Institute for Jewish and Community
Research in Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles. The Article has benefited from conversa-
tions with colleagues at the Civil Rights Commission and Department of Education, including
Abigail Thernstrom and Jennifer Braceras; astute comments from Eugene Volokh; and research
conducted by Eric DaLeo, David Leeman, and John Blakeley. The views presented here are
the author's alone and may not reflect the positions of either the Civil Rights Commission
or the Department of Education.
1 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS REGARDING CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM 1
(2006), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/050306FRUSCCRRCAS.pdf [hereinafter
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS] (finding that "[mlany college campuses throughout the
United States continue to experience incidents of anti-Semitism" and that "[t]his is a serious
problem which warrants further attention"). The author is the principal draftsman of the Findings
and Recommendations.
2 Specifically, Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2000).
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Until late 2004, the U.S. Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
largely avoided anti-Semitism cases based on two concerns, both of which have strong
intuitive appeal. First, Jews are not considered to constitute a distinct "race" as that
term is used in contemporary social science or in common public usage.3 Second,
Congress elected not to prohibit religious discrimination in Title VI, and anti-Semitism
is, among other things, a form of religious discrimination.4 Until 2004, OCR did not
recognize that Jews also form an ethnic or ancestral group and that the scope of legis-
latively prohibited "racial" discrimination may not be limited by either social scientific
or colloquial use of that term. In late 2004, OCR finally determined that Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits anti-Semitic harassment at federally funded
public and private universities, except to the extent that the harassment is exclusively
based on tenets of the student's religious faith.5 In other words, OCR policy now
treats anti-Semitic harassment as prohibited racial or ethnic harassment except when
it is clearly limited to religious belief rather than ancestral heritage.
This new OCR policy has been controversial. 6 Critics contend that OCR over-
stepped its jurisdictional bounds and that the federal government lacks the authority
to prevent anti-Semitic incidents even at tax-payer funded educational programs and
activities.7 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, in a divided vote, confirmed OCR's
2004 interpretation and urged vigorous enforcement of Title VI to protect Jewish
3 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office for Civil Rights (HEW-
OCR), Undated Summary of Policy [hereinafter HEW-OCR], quoting Memorandum from
Cindy Brown, Deputy Dir., HEW-OCR, to Dir., OCR Region VII (Sept. 19, 1977).
4 id.
' The author served as head of OCR at that time and was responsible for issuing the
OCR policy guidance on anti-Semitism. See Letter from Kenneth L. Marcus, Deputy
Assistant Sec'y for Enforcement, Delegated the Auth. of Assistant Sec'y of Educ. for Civil
Rights, U.S. Dep't of Educ., to Colleague, Title VI and Title IX Religious Discrimination in
Schools and Colleges (Sept. 13, 2004), available at http://www.ed.gov/print/about/offices/
list/ocr/religious-rights2004.html [hereinafter 2004 OCR Dear Colleague Letter]; Letter from
Kenneth L. Marcus, Delegated the Auth. of Assistant Sec'y of Educ. for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep't of Educ., to Sidney Groeneman, Ph.D., Senior Research Assoc., Inst. for Jewish & Cmty.
Research (on file with author) [hereinafter IJCR Letter]. OCR issued approximately 20,000
copies of the Dear Colleague Letter to colleges, universities, school districts, state departments
of education, and other recipients of federal education funds and formally apprised Congress
of this action. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 1, 20 (2004), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/ocr/annrpt2004/
annrpt2004.doc [hereinafter OCR ANNUAL REPORT 2004].
6 See, e.g., Meghan Clyne, Education Department Backs Away from Anti-Semitism
Safeguards, N.Y. SUN, Mar. 29,2006 ("Against a backdrop of alleged anti-Semitism at some
of the nation's top universities, including Harvard and Columbia, the federal Department of
Education is said to be backing away from a 2004 policy of protecting Jewish students against
discrimination and harassment on campus.").
' See, e.g., Jennifer Jacobson, Civil-Rights Panel Urges Federal Monitoring of Campus
Anti-Semitism, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 14, 2006, at A27.
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students from harassment.8 By way of disclosure, the author served as head of OCR
at the time that it issued its 2004 policy and director of the Civil Rights Commission
at the time that it issued both its findings and recommendations on campus anti-
Semitism and its full report on that topic.
This Article will argue that anti-Semitic harassment at federally assisted programs
and activities, including post-secondary institutions, constitutes racial discrimination
prohibited by Title VI when sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive
as to deny equal educational opportunities to Jewish students. This argument runs
counter to commonly held intuitions for the two reasons that long delayed OCR's de-
cision to extend civil rights protections to Jewish students: reluctance to characterize
Jews as a race (with all of the nineteenth century pseudo-scientific and mid-twentith
century anti-Semitic connotations with which that designation is laden)9 or to resist
Congress's presumed intention to exclude religious groups from Title VI protection.
Nevertheless, this Article will show that the scope of Title VI prohibition on racial dis-
crimination encompasses anti-Semitism to the same wide extent as does the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (the "1866 Act"). This follows from the
1964 Act's basic purpose to provide new mechanisms to enforce previously estab-
lished rights, not to create new rights or to provide enforcement mechanisms that
apply only to a subcategory of the groups protected under the Fourteenth. The fact
that Jews are not considered a racial group, as that term is now understood, is simply
not relevant.
While the long legislative history of Title VI is generally sparse on anti-Semitism,
it does demonstrate congressional intent that the scope of prohibited racial discrimi-
nation should be coextensive with existing constitutional protections, particularly
those provided in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in turn crafted that clause to constitutionalize
the anti-discrimination protections already contained in the 1866 Act, which prohibits
racial discrimination in the making of contracts and enjoyment of property.' ° The
8 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 1; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVILRIGHTs,
CAMPus ANTI-SEMmsM: BRIEFING REPORT 72 (2005), available at http://www.usccr.gov/
pubs/081506campusantibrief07.pdf [hereinafter CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM]. The author
supervised the preparation of CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM, supra.
9 Through the first half of the twentieth century, in judicial opinions, as in both scientific
and colloquial discourse, Jewish people were routinely referred to as a "race," often without
anti-Semitic connotation. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,703,724 (1931); Orth v. United States, 142 F.2d 969, 973
(4th Cir. 1944); Baumgartner v. United States, 138 F.2d 29, 33 (8th Cir. 1943), rev'd, 322
U.S. 665 (1944); Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122 F.2d 288,290 (2d Cir. 1941),
affd, 316 U.S. 642 (1942); Rosenthal v. United States, 45 F.2d 1000, 1003 (8th Cir. 1930);
Gleckman v. United States, 16 F.2d 670, 672 (8th Cir. 1926); Skuy v. United States, 261 F.
316, 320 (8th Cir. 1919); United States v. Claassen, 56 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ind. 1944);
Dearborn Pub. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 271 F. 479, 483 (N.D. Ohio 1921).
10 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).
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1866 Act prohibited racial discrimination broadly, not limiting its terms to the pro-
tection of groups that would in today's lexicon be deemed "racial." In Shaare Tefila
Congregation v. Cobb, the Supreme Court correctly established that Jews, like Arabs
and other ethnic minority groups, are protected from "racial" discrimination under the
1866 Act. " Accordingly, Jewish students are protected from racial discrimination
under Title VI, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 1866 Act, just as OCR has
declared. In other words, it is a simple corollary of the unity of anti-discrimination
law- the equal scope of racial discrimination law in the civil rights legislation of
both the Reconstruction era and the Civil Rights era-that the 1964 Act bars anti-
Semitic acts to the same extent as does the 1866 Act.
This Article will explain whether, and to what extent, Title VI is available as a
means of ensuring that federally funded educational institutions do not tolerate ha-
rassment of Jewish students. Part I of the Article describes the background, nature,
sources, extent, and major recent manifestations of American campus anti-Semitism
and governmental responses to this phenomenon. This Part will demonstrate the seri-
ousness of the current situation on many American campuses and explain the emerg-
ing strands in recent anti-Semitism that distinguish it from traditional variants. As
with recent incidents of anti-Semitism globally, recent incidents on American college
campuses emerge from numerous divergent sources, but the conspicuous growth in
anti-Semitism has been in incidents related to anti-Zionism and anti-Israelism. Part
II assesses the application of Title VI to anti-Semitic harassment, concluding that Title
VI prohibits anti-Jewish discrimination as a form of racial discrimination, subject to
a narrow exception for discrimination based exclusively on the tenets of Jewish re-
ligious belief. In the course of this analysis, the Article will present surprising findings
regarding the decision by Congress to delete "religion" from the prohibited forms of
discrimination under Title VI. Part I examines the scope of Title VI prohibition of
anti-Semitism, arguing that the coverage of harassment law generally is somewhat
narrower than OCR's policy suggests but that it is nevertheless sufficiently broad to
encompass the most serious allegations that have been made of recent campus anti-
Semitism. This last Part will also address First Amendment limitations on harassment
law, concluding that they are neither more nor less stringent than those that apply to
other analogous areas of harassment law.
It should be noted that many recent campus activities, although arguably anti-
Semitic, do not rise to the level of harassment and are therefore outside of the
scope of this Article: divestment movements, 2 anti-Israeli or anti-Zionist academic
" 481 U.S. 615, 617-18 (1987). Since Shaare Tefila, Jewish people have established
standing to pursue § 1981 claims in various cases. See, e.g., Sinai v. New England Tel. &
Tel. Co., 3 F.3d 471 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1025 (1994); Singer v. Denver
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 959 F. Supp. 1325, 1330-31 (D. Colo. 1997).
12 On September 17, 2002, then-Harvard University President Lawrence H. Summers
famously identified anti-Semitic overtones in the campaign to divest from Israel, stating that
"[s]erious and thoughtful people are advocating and taking actions that are anti-Semitic in their
effect if not their intent." Lawrence H. Summers, President, Harvard Univ., Address at
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literature, 13 Holocaust denial, 4 intimidation of pro-Israeli speakers,"5 anti-Zionist
bias in programs of Middle East studies, 16 anti-Israel boycotts, 17 and refusal to pro-
vide religious accommodations to Jewish students. 8 This Article will focus, rather,
Morning Prayers (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/
2002/morningprayers.html. As Summers explained, "some here at Harvard and some at univer-
sities across the country have called for the University to single out Israel among all nations
as the lone country where it is inappropriate for any part of the university's endowment to be
invested." Id. Several commentators have joined in Summers's condemnation of the divest-
ment movement. See, e.g., GARY A. TOBIN, ARYEH K. WEINBERG & JENNA FERER, THE
UNCIVIL UNIVERSITY 180-83 (2005). Others, of course, have disagreed and defended the di-
vestment movement, which now appears to have waned considerably. See, e.g., Will Youmans,
The Divestment Campaign, in THE POLITICS OF ANTI-SEMITISM 69, 69-72 (Alexander
Cockbum & Jeffrey St. Clair eds., 2003) (arguing that divestment "is not a knee-jerk, anti-
Israel reaction as critics maintain" but "an objective, nonpartisan American policy"). One
commentator has observed that the "bitter attack[s]" that some have leveled at Summers
for those comments demonstrates the heatedness of this debate. WALTER LAQUEUR, THE
CHANGING FACE OF ANTI-SEMHTISM: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY, at ix (2006).
"3 The most controversial recent example may be John Mearsheimer & Stephen Walt, The
Israel Lobby, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 23, 2006, at 3, available at http://www.lrb.co
.uk/v28/n06/mear0l_.html (arguing that U.S. Middle East policy is driven primarily by the
"Israel Policy" and is contrary to American interests). See also Posting of Jefferson Morley
to World Opinion Roundup blog, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/worldopinionroundup/
2006/03/global divide on israeljlobby.html (Mar. 31,2006, 10:07 EST) (surveying recent
responses to Mearsheimer-Walt article, including positive European response and negative
American and Israeli response).
14 See generally Geri J. Yonover, Anti-Semitism and Holocaust Denial in the Academy:
A Tort Remedy, 101 DICK. L. REV. 71 (1996) (detailing incidents of Holocaust denial among
college professors).
15 See TOBIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 172-76 (describing bomb threat to Natan Sharansky
at Boston University, vilification of Ehud Barak at the University of California at Berkeley, and
mistreatment of other Israeli and pro-Israeli speakers at various campuses); Ismail Khald,
The Bedouin Activist, JEWISH WORLD, Oct. 24, 2004, http://www.aish.com/jewishissues/
jewishsociety/TheBedouinActivist.asp ("[Tlhe situation I encountered on many of the
campuses in North America and Canada was horrifying .... In my years of speaking to
people, I've never received threats or personal attacks like I did speaking on campuses.").
16 See TOBIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 155-68 (describing politicization and anti-Zionist
bias in Middle East Studies Departments). Such perceptions have led some to question whether
the federal government is fueling campus anti-Semitism by funding anti-Zionist projects in
Middle East Studies programs under Title VI of the Higher Education Act. See, e.g.,
International Programs in Higher Education and Questions of Bias: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 108th Cong. 9-11
(2003) (statement of Stanley Kurtz, Research Fellow, Hoover Inst., and Contributing Editor,
Nat'l Review Online). But see id. at 13-15 (statement of Terry W. Hartle, Senior Vice
President, Government and Public Affairs, American Council on Education).
" See Kenneth Lasson, Scholarly and Scientific Boycotts oflsrael: Abusing the Academic
Enterprise, 21 TOURO L. REV. 989 (2006).
'" See Joshua C. Weinberger, Comment, Religion and Sex in the Yale Dorms: A Legislative
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on incidents that may rise to the level of discrimination or harassment under federal
anti-discrimination law.
I. THE RESURGENCE OF CAMPUS ANTI-SEMITISM
A. Recent Anti-Semitic Incidents
1. Background and Context
The series of troubling incidents that have emerged on college campuses in recent
years have been conspicuous, not because they reflect a broader atmosphere of hos-
tility towards Jews, but because they have been ugly exceptions in an environment
that has been welcoming in other respects to Jewish students. 9 The United States has
in recent years enjoyed a period of almost philo-Semitic tolerance for Jews, 20 in con-
trast to the experience of Jews elsewhere in the world.21 Similarly, many college cam-
puses have provided numerous accommodations to Jewish students, such as excused
absence for religious holidays, kosher dining facilities, chaplaincy services, Hillel, and
Jewish studies courses.22 By and large, Jewish students no longer face institutional
Proposal Requiring Private Universities to Provide Religious Accommodations, 147 U. PA.
L. REv. 205 (1998) (proposing legislation to ensure that colleges provide reasonable accom-
modations for students' religious practices).
'9 Chaim Seidler-Feller, Advocacy and Education as Divergent Strategies in the Effort
to Support Israel on Campus, in AMERICAN JEwRY AND THE COLLEGE CAMPuS: BEST OF TIMES
OR WORST OF TIMES? 32 (Deborah E. Lipstadt et al. eds., 2005) (describing the current period
as a "golden age" for Jews on American campuses); see also Anti-Defamation League,
Statement to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: Anti-Semitic Incidents on College Campuses
(Nov. 18,2005), http://www.adl.org/mainAntiSemitismDomesticincidents-on-college
_campuses.htm [hereinafter ADL Statement] (describing as "paradoxical" the emergence of
"the American college and university campus ... as a flashpoint for anti-Jewish animus and a
site for the expression and dissemination of anti-Semitism" at a time when Jewish students
have "found the American campus to be a positive environment" in other respects).
20 According to Dr. Gary Tobin of the Institute for Jewish and Community Research,
"[p]ositive perceptions of Jews have been steadily growing over the last forty years, while
negative perceptions of Jews declined precipitiously following the Great Depression and World
War II." TOBIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 81.
21 See, e.g., ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP AGAINST ANTISEMITISM, REPORT OF
THE ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY INTO ANTISEMrrISM (2006), available at http://
thepcaa.org/Report.pdf [hereinafter ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY] (documenting the recent
rise of anti-Semitic incidents in the United Kingdom); MICHAEL MCCLINTOCK & JUDITH
SUNDERLAND, ANTISEMITISM IN EUROPE: CHALLENGING OFFICIAL INDIFFERENCE (2004),
available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/discrimination/antisemitism/antisemitism-report
_22_april_2004.pdf (reporting on anti-Semitism in Europe on behalf of Human Rights First);
GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, THE RETURN OF ANTi-SEMrrISM (2004); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT
ON GLOBAL ANTI-SEMITISM (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/40258.htm.
22 ADL Statement, supra note 19; American Jewish Committee, Statement to the U.S.
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discrimination in academic admissions,23 undergraduate housing,24 faculty selection,25
and club membership26 that they experienced for a significant part of the twentieth
century.27 On the other hand, allegations of anti-Semitic activity appear to have in-
creased on college campuses in recent years and have included physical assault, stalk-
ing, intimidation, vandalism, and various forms of hate speech.28 In 2006, the U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, in the form of a Letter from Kenneth Stem, Program Specialist on
Anti-Semitism & Extremism, to Chairman Gerald A. Reynolds (Nov. 18, 2005) [hereinafter
AJC Statement]; Israel on Campus Coalition, Statement to the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights,
in the form of a Letter from the ICC Steering Committee to the Members of the U.S. Comm'n
on Civil Rights (Nov. 17, 2005) [hereinafter ICC Statement]. Signatories of the ICC Statement
include representatives of Aish Hatorah, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the
Anti-Defamation League, the Charles and Lynn Schusterman Family Foundation, the Con-
ference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, Hillel: The Foundation for
Jewish Campus Life, the Jewish Council for Public Affairs/United Jewish Communities, and
current undergraduate students.
23 Formal restrictions on academic admissions of Jewish students began in the 1920s and
continued to the mid-century. As early as 1914, Dean Frederick Paul Keppel from Columbia
University decried the multiplication of Jewish students on his campus, which he believed
threatened to render Columbia "socially uninviting." LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMmsM
IN AMERICA 85 (1994). Administrators expressed similar concerns at Williams, Yale, Princeton,
and the University of Pennsylvania. Id. Harvard University President, A. Lawrence Lowell,
recommended restrictions on Jewish admissions to address their burgeoning enrollment at
selective institutions. Id. at 84. At Harvard, "the percentage of Jewish undergraduates had
tripled from 6 percent in 1908 to 22 percent in 1922." Id. Following Harvard's lead, restrictions
on Jewish enrollment were established at Yale, Princeton, Columbia, Cornell, Rutgers, Bamard,
Adelphi, Johns Hopkins, Northwestern, Penn State, Ohio State, Washington and Lee, and the
Universities of Cincinnati, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Id.
at 85-86. At Harvard, geographic diversity was developed as an admissions criterion specifi-
cally to reduce Jewish admissions, based on the assumption that Jewish students were dis-
proportionately located in Northeastern urban hubs. Id. at 86.
24 For example, Jews were housed separately from Christian students at Syracuse
University from 1927 to 1931. Id. "Ohio State segregated Jews in some female dormitories
while Gentile students at the Universities of Michigan and Nebraska were advised against asso-
ciating with Jewish males." Id.
25 Discrimination in faculty employment reflected a larger practice of anti-Semitic employ-
ment discrimination in the twentieth century. In 1927, Yale, Princeton, Johns Hopkins, and
the Universities of Chicago, Georgia, and Texas each included one token Jew on their faculty.
Id. at 87. Those few academics who were selected for faculty positions were described by their
supporters as lacking the characteristics which make other Jews offensive. Id. at 88.
26 During the early-to-mid-twentieth century, most college fraternities shunned Jewish
pledges. Id. at 87.
27 ADL Statement, supra note 19 ("Institutional anti-Semitism, discrimination, and quotas
against Jewish students and faculty is largely a thing of the past.").
28 For example, the ADL's 2005 audit of anti-Semitic incidents reports ninety-eight anti-
Semitic incidents on American campuses in 2005, an increase of nearly one-third from 2004.
Id. According to the ADL, anti-Semitic incidents in the United States declined last year. Id.
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Commission on Civil Rights concluded that these incidents pose a "serious problem
which warrants further attention."29
2. Sources of Campus Anti-Semitism
These episodes are not unrelated to the outbreak of incidents that have been chron-
icled elsewhere in the world, particularly in Western Europe and the Middle East.
30
The U.S. State Department has provided a helpful analysis of this global outbreak,
finding that recent global anti-Semitism has had four major sources:
" Traditional centuries-old European anti-Jewish prejudice, associated with
stereotypes of Jewish control of government, the media, international
business, and the financial sector;
" Aggressive "anti-Israel sentiment that crosses the line between objective
[political] criticism of Israeli policies and anti-Semitism";
* Muslim anti-Semitism, common among Europe's growing Muslim popu-
lation, based on age-old hatred of Jews, as well as Muslim opposition to
Israel and American policies in Iraq; and
* Anti-American and anti-globalist anger that "spills over to Israel, and to
Jews," who are identified with Israel, globalism and America.3'
The same forms of anti-Semitism may also be found on American college cam-
puses, except that two additional forms have also been found in the American post-
secondary context: black anti-Semitism, including incidents associated with the
Nation of Islam32 and fundamentalist intolerance, exemplified by allegations at the
United States Air Force Academy.33 By and large, however, the most significant
recent episodes of campus anti-Semitism have been associated with anti-Zionism,34
arising partly in response to the second intifada in 2000 and the continuing Israeli-
Palestinian crisis.35
3. The Ideology of the New Campus Anti-Semitism
The recent increase in campus anti-Semitism has been closely associated with
increasing anti-Zionist sentiments and with liberal or left-wing elements at many
29 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 1.
30 See, e.g., SCHOENFELD, supra note 21, passim.
31 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 21.
32 ABRAHAM H. FOXMAN, NEVER AGAIN? THE THREAT OF THE NEW ANTI-SEMITISM
160-93 (2003).
33 See, e.g., Editorial, Zealots at the Air Force Academy, N.Y. TIMES, June 11,2005, at A12.
31 SCHOENFELD, supra note 21, at 152; AJC Statement, supra note 22, at 1.
35 SCHOENFELD, supra note 21, at 152.
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American universities. The relationship among these phenomena has been a source
of considerable controversy.36 In general, the relationship between anti-Semitism
and anti-Zionism is both close and complex, and it has been presented differently in
various places and periods. To the extent that liberal or progressive voices have come
to adopt anti-Zionist rhetoric, they have taken with it the anti-Semitic attitudes from
which much anti-Zionism has been inseparable.
Commentators have articulated the present North American relationship between
these attitudes in different formulations, each of which appears to contain at least a
kernel of truth. Many commentators argue that (i) anti-Zionism is anti-Semitic in
its essence and in most, if not all, of its manifestations;37 (ii) anti-Zionism and anti-
Semitism are both analytically and historically distinct, but the two ideologies have
merged since 1948;38 (iii) anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism remain distinct, but
anti-Zionism occasionally crosses the line into "outright anti-Semitism, '39 while
anti-Semitism often pollutes anti-Zionist discourse; 4° and/or (iv) anti-Zionism is
36 This has been evident, for instance, in the emotional public response to Professor Alvin
Rosenfeld's cogent essay on "'Progressive' Jewish Thought and the New Anti-Semitism."
See, e.g., Essay Linking Liberal Jews and Anti-Semitism Sparks a Furor, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 31,
2007, at El.
17 See, e.g., Irwin Coder, Human Rights and the New Anti-Jewishness, FRONTPAGE
MAG., Feb. 16,2004, http://frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=- 12191 ("[C]lassical
or traditional anti-Semitism is the discrimination against, or denial of, the right of Jews to
live as equal members of a free society; the new anti-Semitism-incompletely, or incorrectly,
[described] as 'anti-Zionism' .. .-involves the discrimination against, denial of, or assault
upon the right of the Jewish people to live as an equal member of the family of nations. What
is intrinsic to each form of anti-Semitism--and common to both--is discrimination. All that
has happened is that it has moved from discrimination against Jews as individuals-a classical
anti-Semitism for which there are indices of measurement (e.g., discrimination against Jews
in education, housing, or employment)-to discrimination against Jews as people-a new anti-
Semitism--for which one has yet to develop indices of measurement." (omissions in original)).
Those who hold this position must account for the fact that some Jewish individuals hold
views sharply critical of Israeli policy; a small number of Haredi groups, such as Neturei Karta,
oppose the existence of a state of Israel (prior to the arrival of the Messiah) on theological
grounds; and there are also some secular Jews who oppose the State of Israel on anti-
nationalist grounds.
38 See, e.g., Robert Wistrich, Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism, 16 JEWISH POL. STUD. REV.
27-28 (2004), available at http://www.jcpa.org/phas/phas-wistrich-f04.htm.
'9 Deborah E. Lipstadt, Strategic Responses to Anti-Israelism and Anti-Semitism, in
AMERICAN JEWRY AND THE COLLEGE CAMPUS, supra note 19, at 5, 23.
40 ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 21, at 18 ("Anti-Zionist discourse that has
become polluted by antisemitic themes or content is also difficult to identify because it is often
based on at least partial truths which have become inflated or exaggerated to the point that they
are held to be typical of all Jews or demonstrative of an antisemetic Jewish stereotype....
An example of this would be remarks about the Israel lobby.... [I]n some quarters this be-
comes inflated to the point where discourse about the 'lobby' resembles discourse about a
world Jewish conspiracy.").
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analytically distinct from anti-Semitism, but much apparent criticism of Israel or
Zionism is in fact a thinly veiled expression of anti-Semitism. 4' Relatively few com-
mentators have taken the more extreme position that all anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism.
Several government agencies, officials, and other commentators have devel-
oped frameworks to distinguish this political anti-Semitism from legitimate criti-
cism of Israel,42 including the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 4 3 the U.S. Depart-
ment of State,' the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, formerly known
as the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia of the European
Union (EUMC), 45 the United Kingdom's All-Party Parliamentary Group Against
41 See, e.g., id. ("[A]nti-Zionist discourse... can be used deliberately as a way to mask
or articulate prejudice against Jews."); FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at
1 ("Anti-Semitic bigotry is no less morally deplorable when camouflaged as anti-Israelism
or anti-Zionism."). Unsurprisingly, recent research has shown a close correlation between anti-
Israeli views and anti-Semitic views based on a survey of citizens in ten European countries.
Edward H. Kaplan & Charles A. Small, Anti-Israel Sentiment Predicts Anti-Semitism in
Europe, 50 J. CoNFLICT RESOLUTION 548 (2006).
42 See generally New Antisemitism, WIKIPEDIA.COM, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New
_antisemitism (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) (detailing some of the entities and persons who
have discussed this issue).
4' The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has identified the use of "traditional anti-Semitic
elements" as a distinguishing feature of anti-Israelism or anti-Zionism that crosses the line
into anti-Semitism:
On many campuses, anti-Israeli or anti-Zionist propaganda has been dis-
seminated that includes traditional anti-Semitic elements, including age-
old anti-Jewish stereotypes and defamation. This has included, for
example, anti-Israel literature that perpetuates the medieval anti-Semitic
blood libel of Jews slaughtering children for ritual purpose, as well as
anti-Zionist propaganda that exploits ancient stereotypes of Jews as
greedy, aggressive, overly powerful, or conspiratorial. Such propa-
ganda should be distinguished from legitimate discourse regarding
foreign policy. Anti-Semitic bigotry is no less morally deplorable when
camouflaged as anti-Israelism or anti-Zionism.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 1.
44 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 21.
45 According to the EUMC,
Examples of the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard
to the state of Israel taking into account the overall context could include:
Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g.,
by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected
or demanded of any other democratic nation.
Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism
(e.g. claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel
or Israelis. Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that
of the Nazis.
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Antisemitism,4 Canadian Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler,47 Israeli (former Minister
of Diaspora Affairs and Jerusalem) Natan Sharansky,49 and Professors Bernard
Lewis50 and Robert Wistrich.5 ' In general, government agencies and academic com-
mentators have identified these characteristics to distinguish political anti-Semitism
from legitimate criticism of Israel:
Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of
Israel.
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Working Definition of Antisemitism
(Mar. 16,2005), http://eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/pub/AS/AS-WorkingDefinition-draft
.pdf [hereinafter EUMC Working Definition]. The EUMC has been careful to stress, however,
that "criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as
antisemitic." Id.
46 ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 21, at 5 (endorsing the EUMC Working
Definition).
41 Coder identifies "discrimination against, denial of, or assault upon the right of the Jewish
people to live as an equal member of the family of nations" as the distinguishing feature of
what he, like some other commentators, refers to as the "new anti-Semitism." Cotder, supra
note 37.
48 ADL Statement, supra note 19.
49 Sharansky has suggested a "3D" test to distinguish one from the other:
The first D is the test of demonization.... Jews were demonized for
centuries as the embodiment of evil. Therefore, today we must be wary
of whether the Jewish state is being demonized by having its actions
blown out of all sensible proportion. ... The second D is the test of
double standards. For thousands of years a clear sign of anti-Semitism
was treating Jews differently than other peoples, from the discriminatory
laws many nations enacted against them to the tendency to judge their
behavior by a different yardstick. Similarly, today we must ask whether
criticism of Israel is being applied selectively.... The third D is the test
of deligitimation [sic]. In the past, anti-Semites tried to deny the legiti-
macy of the Jewish religion, the Jewish people, or both. Today, they are
trying to deny the legitimacy of the Jewish state, presenting it, among
other things, as the last vestige of colonialism.
Natan Sharansky, Anti-Semitism in 3D, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 23, 2004, available at http://
www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/022304JPostShar.shtml; see also ADL Statement, supra note 19
(citing approvingly Sharansky's analysis).
" Bernard Lewis has also identified two of the common features that distinguish anti-
Semitism from legitimate criticism of Israel: demonization of Israel and the use of double stan-
dards. Bernard Lewis, The New Anti-Semitism: First Religion, then Race, then What?, 75 AM.
SCHOLAR 25, 26-27 (2006).
"' Robert Wistrich's "litmus test" is to determine whether anti-Zionist criticism argues
for dismantling Israel, engages in demonization, and uses "classic anti-Semitic stereotypes."
Correspondence from Robert Wistrich, Dir., Vidal Sassoon Int'l Ctr. for the Study of Anti-
Semitism, Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, to Brian Klug, Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Univ.
(2005), available at http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/klug.html.
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(1) Using "classic anti-Semitic stereotypes" to characterize Israel,52 which
may also include "demonization" of Israelis, similar to older character-
izations of the Jewish people as the "embodiment of evil. 53
(2) "Applying double standards [which may involve] requiring behavior of
[Israel] not expected ... of any other" nations' or denying the Jewish
people rights and legitimacy afforded other nations, including the right
of self-determination."
(3) "Drawing comparisons" between Israel and Nazi Germany.5 6 This crite-
rion may be viewed as an application of the first two criteria (demoni-
zation and double standards), but it appears frequently enough to merit
separate mention.
(4) "Holding Jews collectively responsible" for Israeli actions and policy,
regardless of actual complicity.57
Discourse exhibiting these characteristics, even if cloaked as criticism of Israel, has
been characterized more properly as anti-Semitism. Whether these forms of anti-
Semitism may, in conjunction with other conduct, form the basis for a civil rights
claim is of course a separate and exacting inquiry, requiring consideration not only
of the parameters of Title VI protection but also of First Amendment limitations.
Unlike some prior forms of anti-Semitism, which were associated with right-wing
political groups, this burgeoning new form of anti-Semitism has been associated more
with certain forms of liberal or left-wing activism, which have sometimes embraced
anti-Semitism together with support for Palestinian causes both in Europe and in the
United States.58 Although progressive voices have typically stood for equal rights and
social progress, many progressives have found common cause with Arab and Muslim
anti-Zionists, however "illiberal" those groups may be, based on shared anti-American
and anti-capitalist convictions as well as a belief that Palestinian Arabs are the under-
dog in their conflict with Israel.5 9 In some cases, this progressive anti-Zionism,
52 Wistrich, supra note 51; see also FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at
1; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 21; EUMC Working Definition, supra note 45;.
51 Sharansky, supra note 49; see also Lewis, supra note 50, at 27-28; Wistrich, supra note 51.
4 EUMC Working Definition, supra note 45; see also Lewis, supra note 50, at 26-27.
5 Sharansky, supra note 49; Wistrich, supra note 51; EUMC Working Definition, supra
note 45.
16 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 21, at 1; EUMC Working Definition, supra note 45.
57 EUMC Working Definition, supra note 45.
58 LAQUEUR, supra note 12, at 147-50; SCHOENFELD, supra note 21, at 85-100; see also
ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 21, at 32 ("We heard evidence that contemporary
antisemitism in Britain is now more commonly found on the left of the political spectrum than
on the right. Professor Cesaraini submitted that this has made it harder to define and contest
'because it no longer has any resemblance to classical Nazi-style Jew hatred, because it is
masked by or blended inadvertently into anti-Zionism, and because it is often articulated in
the language of human rights."').
59 LAQUEUR, supra note 12, at 147-48; TOBINETAL., supra note 12, at 72-78. The irony
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embraced by some Jewish progressives as well as by non-Jews, has merged with older
European traditions of anti-Semitism that have surfaced from time to time in progres-
sive movements.6° As Walter Laqueur has cautioned, however, "[i]t would be an ex-
aggeration to maintain that contemporary antisemitism is predominantly left wing in
character, just as in previous ages it would have been an exaggeration to apportion
all the responsibility for antisemitism to conservatives.
'61
How have college campuses become "prime propagators" of anti-Semitism, 62 iron-
ically, at a time when the general public holds entirely different views? 63 This phe-
nomenon has resulted from a "perfect storm"' in which campus anti-Zionism and
anti-Semitism have emerged from the confluence of a number of factors including:
0 The politics of many American college campuses have become over-
whelmingly liberal;
65
* Extremist voices are disproportionately influential on college campuses
and are frequently able to "capture organizational" apparatuses even when
they do not command majority support;'
here is that this form of bigotry may arise within an ideology which purports to be anti-racist.
The All-Party Parliamentary Group Against Anti-Semitism points out that "[m]any on the left
are firm in their condemnation of racism and would almost certainly not accept that they were
guilty of antisemitic discourse" and offers, rather generously, that "[i]gnorance of the history
of anti-Jewish prejudice means that some perhaps do not even realise that the language and
imagery they have used has resonances of a long tradition of anti-Jewish discourse and stereo-
types." ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 21, at 33. In fact, the phenomenon may at
times result from conscious manipulation as well as historical ignorance. Id. at 38 ("[W]hen
left wing or pro-Palestinian discourse around the Middle East is manipulated and used as a
vehicle for anti-Jewish language and themes, the antisemitism is harder to recognise and define
and Jewish students can find themselves isolated and unsupported, or in conflict with large
groups of their fellow students.").
60 SCHOENFELD, supra note 21, at 92-96; see also LAQUEUR, supra note 12, at 171-89.
61 LAQUEUR, supra note 12, at 150.
62 SCHOENFELD, supra note 21, at 123. Schoenfeld argues that the disproportionate rise in
campus anti-Semitism reflects "an unexpected twist in the helix of anti-Semitism's DNA," in
which "the most vicious ideas about Jews are primarily voiced not by downtrodden and dis-
enfranchised fringe elements of society but by its most successful, educated and 'progressive'
members." Id. at 3-4. Hence, Schoenfeld argues, "[o]ne is less likely to find anti-Semites today
in beer halls and trailer parks than on college campuses and among the opinion makers of the
media elite." Id. at 3.
63 Harold Shapiro & Steven Bayme, Foreword to AMERICAN JEWRY AND THE COLLEGE
CAMPUS, supra note 19, at 1, 2.
4 This metaphor has been invoked by both Lipstadt, supra note 39, at 19, and Gary A.
Tobin, Uncivil University: Anti-Semitism and Anti-Israelism in Higher Education, in CAMPUS
ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 8, at 27, 32.
65 Lipstadt, supra note 39, at 19.
' Tobin, supra note 64, at 33 n.8.
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" Contemporary anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist ideologies mesh well with anti-
Western, anti-American, and anti-war ideologies, and ideologies that are
also common on college campuses;
6 7
" Anti-Israel groups have targeted campuses as "an arena for the anti-Israel
agenda,"68 just as, in fairness, pro-Israel groups have targeted campuses
for a pro-Israel agenda;
* "Since the collapse of the Oslo accords... Israel has been depicted in
much of the press as the 'oppressor."' 69
* Many universities have failed to take appropriate action to prevent the
spread of anti-Semitism, largely as a result of bureaucratic inertia;7
" Many figures who have the authority to stand up to the perpetrators of
anti-Semitic incidents (e.g., administrators, trustees, faculty) fail to exer-
cise appropriate leadership for fear of "rock[ing] the boat," "appear[ing]
overzealous, or interfering with academic freedom.",71
This perfect storm has erupted in several high-profile incidents on campuses
around the country over the last few years, which generally fall under the rubric of
the "new anti-Semitism." These incidents have had several ingredients in common:
(i) Jewish students have been singled out, either by other students or by faculty, for
adverse treatment, (ii) the perpetrators have been outspoken critics of Israel, and
(iii) the alleged anti-Semitic conduct has been intertwined with anti-Israeli or anti-
Zionist rhetoric.
4. Case Study "A": San Francisco State University
On May 7, 2002, an ugly incident at San Francisco State University awakened
public attention to this new emergence of an ancient prejudice. At that campus, which
had already developed a reputation in some circles as an unwelcoming place for Jews,
over "[flour hundred Jewish students held a... 'Sit-in for Peace in the Middle East',
[sic] hoping to engage the pro-Palestinian students... in 'dialogue.' ' 72 As the rally
concluded, "pro-Palestinian students surrounded the 30 remaining Jewish students,"
shouting death threats.73 Professor Laurie Zoloff, a witness to the event, reported that,
"[c]ounter demonstrators poured into the plaza, screaming at the Jews to 'Get out
or we will kill you' and 'Hitler did not finish the job." 74 Others reported shouts of
67 Id. at 33.
68 Id. at 32.
69 Lipstadt, supra note 39, at 19.
70 Tobin, supra note 64, at 32.
7' Id. at 32-33.
72 Sarah Stem, Campus Anti-Semitism, in CAMPUS ANTI-SEMrSM, supra note 8, at 22.
73 Id.
74 TOBIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 172.
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"F the Jews!" and "Die racist pigs! 75 Police allegedly refused to take any action
other than to surround the Jewish students and community members, who were re-
portedly trapped while an angry mob chanted for their death.76 The San Francisco
police then marched the Jewish group to the Hillel House and remained on guard.
7
Some rally participants reported feeling "very threatened" and fearing that violence
would ensue but for the police presence. 78 The May 7 rally was hardly the only anti-
Semitic episode at San Francisco State that year. "In April, a flyer advertising a pro-
Palestinian rally... featured a picture of a dead baby, with the words, 'Canned
Palestinian Children Meat-Slaughtered According to Jewish Rites Under American
License .... ,,,7' This flyer explicitly revived the centuries-old "blood libel that Jews
eat gentile children."8 °
San Francisco State's President, Robert A. Corrigan, responded firmly to these
incidents.81 Responding to the "blood libel" flyers, Corrigan wrote "strong letters" to
the responsible student groups, insisting that the flyer "'is no political statement,"'
that it is "'hate speech in words and image,"' and that its language "echoes a type of
ugly myth that has been used through the centuries specifically to generate hatred." 82
He further announced that "[t]he flier was much more than an offense to the Jewish
community; it was an offense to the entire University community and all that we stand
for-most especially our ability to see the humanity in those with whom we disagree." 83
Then, in a strongly worded letter to all members of the university community, he con-
demned the demonstrators who "behaved in a manner that completely violated the
values of this institution and of most of you who are reading this message.
' '
5. Case Study "B": Columbia University
At Columbia University, a number of students have come forward claiming that
they feel intimidated and fearful in courses in Columbia's Middle East and Asian
Languages and Cultures (MEALAC) program. The documentary film Columbia
Unbecoming, "produced by a group of Columbia students under the guidance of the
David Project," details a pattern of anti-Semitic activities at Columbia University.85
The most high-profile reports of bias recently involved MEALAC. In one famous
" Stem, supra note 72, at 22.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 CAMPus ANTI-SEMrITSM, supra note 8, at 60-64.
82 Id. at 61.
83 id.
Id. at 62.
85 ADL Statement, supra note 19.
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incident described in the film, a Columbia student described an encounter that she
had with Columbia University Professor George Saliba:
Towards the end of the semester, Professor Saliba showed what
I felt was an anti-Israel film, showing the contemporary conflict
between Palestinians and Israelis with a very one-sided view. The
film and Saliba presented a view that Arabs have a prior claim to
the land of Israel. And I felt very differently about that. And I
was sure to express my opinion. For a few minutes, we discussed
it inside the classroom and then George Saliba sort of drew me
outside the classroom, and told me to walk with him this way
out.... He said, "You have no voice in this debate." So I said,
"Of course, I'm allowed to express my opinion." He came really
close to me.... [H]e said, "See, you have green eyes." He said,
"You're not a Semite." He said, "I'm a Semite. I have brown
eyes. You have no claim to the land of Israel." 6
In another notorious allegation discussed in the film, Professor Joseph Massad
"spent a class recounting the 'massacre' by the Israelis in Jenin. When a student
raised her hand to ask [whether] Israel often gives warnings ahead of time before
striking terrorist strongholds, Professor Massad [allegedly] screamed back at her, 'I
will not have you deny Israeli atrocities in my class! '' 8 In a third incident, Professor
Hamid Dabashi is said to have written, on September 23, 2004, that Israelis have "a
vulgarity of character that is bone-deep and structural to the skeletal vertebrae of
[their] culture. 88
A faculty committee commissioned to investigate the matter found that there were
no anti-Semitic activities." The committee was, from the beginning, accused of bias,
and Columbia's president was charged with selecting committee members who lacked
objectivity.' Columbia acknowledges identifying "inconsistencies and weaknesses
in the avenues available for students to raise concerns about faculty conduct," and
maintains that these problems were addressed by clarifying and strengthening the
university's "procedures for adjudicating grievances and establish[ing] additional
86 Stem, supra note 72, at 24-25.
87 ADL Statement, supra note 19.
8 Stem, supra note 72, at 69. But see CAMPus ANTI-SEMrrsM, supra note 8, at 59 (relat-
ing Professor Dabashi's partial denial of Stem's claims).
89 The ADL, interestingly, has not used the term "anti-Semitism" against Columbia and
has argued that this designation was a "red herring" and that "anti-Semitism had never been
the core issue at hand." ADL Statement, supra note 19.
9 Id. According to the ADL, "two of the five members [of this committee] had signed
Columbia's divestment petition, one had been the thesis advisor of Joseph Massad and instru-
mental in [hiring him], and one had written a paper blaming Israel" for increasing global anti-
Semitism. Id.
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[opportunities] for students" to communicate with university administrators. 91 The
committee report has been criticized as a "white-wash" (or at least "clumsy" 92), and
critics argue that it yielded nothing more than "a very slight slap on the wrist" for
one faculty member and recommendations for better grievance procedures. 93 Others
argue that a "close reading of the report makes it clear that the committee was using
[the one episode it criticized] to send a broader message," namely: "Anything doesn't
go anymore."'94
6. Case Study "C": The University of California at Irvine
At the University of California at Irvine, numerous anti-Semitic allegations have
been raised over the last few years.95 In 2000, a Jewish student was told to, "Go back
to Russia where you came from" and called a "F ing Jew. 96 In January 2004, a
rock was thrown at a Jewish student wearing a tee shirt that said "Everybody loves a
Jewish boy," barely missing him.97 The rock was thrown from the direction of a stu-
dent group, which was using rocks as paper weights.98 In February 2004, two students
uttered an Arabic phrase which translates as "Slaughter the Jews" when they saw an
Arabic-speaking Jewish student wearing a pin on his sweatshirt emblazoned with
American and Israeli flags.99 During the heated exchange which followed, the Jewish
91 Transcript, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights Meeting of Nov. 18, 2005 apps. at 1-2
(Letter from Alan Brinkley, Provost, Columbia Univ., to Kenneth L. Marcus, Staff Dir., U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights (Nov. 15, 2005)), available at http://www.uscrr.gov/calendar/
trnscrpt/l 1118usccrwappx.pdf. Columbia also emphasizes its efforts to create a welcoming envi-
ronment for Jewish students. Id.; see also Lipstadt, supra note 39, at 5 ("[Mlany pundits have
spoken about the problems at Columbia University while ignoring, almost willfully, the fact
that it is also home to one of the most multifaceted and vibrant Jewish student communities.").
92 Lipstadt, supra note 39, at 15.
93 ADL Statement, supra note 19. But see Lipstadt, supra note 39, at 15 (arguing that
Columbia had "put MEALAC into academic receivership" even before the matter became
public, "essentially stripping members of the department of any control over its internal affairs").
9' Samuel G. Freedman, Keeping Things in Perspective, in AMERICAN JEWRY AND THE
COLLEGE CAMPUS, supra note 19, at 27-28.
9' See, e.g., Marc Ballon, Jewish Students and Activists Call UC Irvine a Hotbed of Anti-
Semitic Harassment, JEWISH J., Mar. 11, 2005, available at http://www.jewishjournal.com/
home/preview.php?id=13779; Kimi Yoshino, Fresh Muslim-Jewish Discord on Campus:
Program Titles are Considered Anti-Semitic by Some at UC Irvine, Site of Civil Rights Probe,
L.A. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at B3.
96 Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), Mem. in Supp. of Its Title VI Claims Against
the University of California, Irvine 11 (Case No. 09-05-2013) (on file with William &Mary
Bill of Rights Journal). The dean allegedly told the student that "there was nothing that the
administration could do, unless 'a student was specifically threatened physically."' Id.
9' Susan B. Tuchman, Statement Submitted to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Briefing
on Campus Anti-Semitism, in CAMPUS ANTI-SEMmSM, supra note 8, at 13, 17.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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student was "surrounded and threatened" by other students.100 In March 2004, "this
same Jewish student was... called a 'dirty Jew"' and denigrated with "threatening
language and hurtful ethnic slurs" by other students. 10 1
In recent years, the campus has also experienced anti-Semitic vandalism, as well
as anti-Semitic hate speech posted in campus signs, published in student newspapers,
and presented at student-sponsored public lectures.0 2 For example, in 2002 a UC
Irvine student publication argued "that Jews are genetically different.., from non-
Jews."'0 3 That same year, "signs began being posted on campus, picturing the Star of
David dripping with blood, and equating [that Jewish symbol] with the swastika."' 4
"In 2003 .... a Holocaust memorial on the UC" Irvine campus was either "destroyed"
or "disturbed"--depending on conflicting accounts of the incident.0 5 In early 2004,
one student-sponsored speaker announced to a UC Irvine audience that "'there are
good Jews and bad Jews.""'° Lecturing from behind a lectern bearing the UC Irvine
emblem, the speaker explained that Jews exhibit an arrogance based on both white
supremacy and the doctrine that Jews are the chosen people.'0 7 Numerous other
university-sponsored public lectures have criticized Jews, Zionism and Israel. Stu-
dents have posted "signs equating Zionism with Nazism, signs with the Star of David
dripping with blood, signs equating Israeli Prime Minister Sharon with Hitler, and signs
of Prime Minister Sharon with a monkey face" next to signs advertising the Jewish
Sabbath dinners.108 Another sign posted on campus read, "Israelis Love to Kill Inno-
cent Children."' At least two UC Irvine students have recently left that campus be-
cause they perceive that it has developed a "hostile environment for Jewish students.""0
UC Irvine students have alleged, in unusual detail, the impact that this harass-
ment has had on their educational opportunities at Irvine. According to the Zionist
Organization of America ("ZOA"), some students have feared for their physical safety,
have asserted that anti-Semitic hostility has adversely affected their academic perfor-
mance, have feared identifying themselves as Jews, have avoided clothing that identi-
fies them as Jews or supporters of Israel, have avoided affiliating with Jewish programs
or activities on campus in which they would otherwise have participated, and have
transferred to other universities to escape the anti-Semitism they allege at UC Irvine."'
1oo Id.
101 Id.
'02 Id. at 14.
103 id.
1"4 Id.
'' Compare id. (stating that memorial was destroyed), with CAMPUs ANTI-SEMITISM,
supra note 8, at 65-66 (providing a statement from Diane Fields Geocaris, Counsel for the
University of California at Irvine, that claimed the monument was disturbed).
106 Tuchman, supra note 97, at 15.
107 Id.
108 ZOA, supra note 96, at 9.
'09 Id. at 10.
'10 Tuchman, supra note 97, at 17.
"' ZOA, supra note 96, at 4.
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The UC Irvine administration has been accused of being "silent and passive" in
the face of these various incidents." 2 For example, in 2002 one Jewish student ex-
pressed her fears to the Chancellor of UC Irvine and other campus administrators:
"'Not only do I feel scared to walk around proudly as a Jewish person on the UC
Irvine campus, I am terrified for anyone to find out. Today I felt threatened that if
students knew that I am Jewish and that I support a Jewish state, I would be attacked
physically.""' 3 "The Chancellor never responded to [the] student's letter."' 1 4 One
administrator who did respond recommended that the student seek professional coun-
seling from the university's Counseling Center."5
7. Incidents at Other Universities
The incidents at San Francisco State, Columbia and Irvine have come to symbol-
ize the status of campus anti-Semitism around the country, but there have been epi-
sodes at other campuses as well." 6 The Anti-Defamation League documented nearly
100 anti-Semitic incidents on American college campuses in 2005 alone. 7 While this
figure may overstate the problem in one respect, because many of the incidents may
be minor, isolated events, it may also understate the problem in a more important re-
spect because most incidents are probably not reported to the ADL. Commentators
disagree as to whether the phenomenon of campus anti-Semitism is "actually limited
to a few well-publicized events,"'"18 such as the incidents at San Francisco State,
112 Id. at 5-6.
113 Tuchman, supra note 97, at 15.
114 Id. at 16.
115 Id.
16 See, e.g., Shapiro & Bayme, supra note 63, at 2 (noting that the "more widespread and
sustained narrative of the integration of Jews and Judaism into university culture [has been]
dwarfed by the surfacing of anti-Israel invective or anti-Semitic hostility" and acknowledging
"some level of exaggerated fears and sensitivities").
17 This represented a significant increase in campus-based anti-Semitic incidents in 2005,
even as general reported non-campus-related incidents were declining. Press Release, Anti-
Defamation League, Annual ADL Audit: Anti-Semitic Incidents Decline in 2005 but Levels
Still of Concern in U.S. (Apr. 5,2006), available at http://www.adl.org/PresRele/ASUS1 2/
audit_2005.htm. As this Article was going to press, ADL reported that anti-Semitic incidents
declined on American Campuses in 2006, after the prior year's increase. Press Release, Anti-
Defamation League, Anti-Semitic Incidents in U.S. Decline in 2006, Despite Year Marked by
Violent Attacks (Mar. 14,2007), available athttp://www.adl.orglPresRele/ASUS_12/4993-12
.htm. ADL's 2006 U.S. findings contrast with reports in other parts of the world which docu-
ment increased anti-Semitic incidents, including increased campus anti-Semitism during that
year. See, e.g., Bill Gladstone, Anti-Semitism Report in Canada Finds Highest Levels in Two
Decades, Mar. 16,2007, http://www.ujc.org/content-display.html?ArticlelD= 106107 ("Per-
haps most alarming to Jewish officials is the steep rise of anti-Jewish activities observed on
college campuses.").
18 Seidler-Feller, supra note 19, at 33.
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Columbia, and Irvine, or whether these incidents are merely some of the most
egregious examples of a problem that is "systemic in higher education and can be
found on campuses all over the United States.""' 9 The author's own experience as a
civil rights official suggests that the truth lies in between: few American campuses
have witnessed the number and intensity of anti-Semitic incidents reported at those
three campuses, but dozens of campuses every year experience at least some mani-
festation of this ugly problem, which is now undoubtedly national in scope.
8. Criticism
Critics argue that equating anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism is a ploy to silence
one side of a policy debate, deflect attention from legitimate criticisms, and intimi-
date critics of Israeli conduct and policy; they also admonish that these views of anti-
Semitism devalue and discredit the concept, creating a boy-who-cries-wolf-problem.12
0
These critics have in turn been charged with turning a blind eye to serious bigotry, de-
veloping arguments which may insulate serious charges from condemnation, and, in ex-
treme cases, succumbing to a "pathology" of "anti-Semitism denial," analogous to the
"intellectual disease" of "Holocaust denial."' 12' While some critics argue that defenders
of Israel describe any criticism of the State of Israel as anti-Semitism, Professor Alan
Dershowitz has characterized this claim as a straw man argument.'22 In fact, many of
the commentators who most vigorously condemn anti-Zionist propaganda as anti-
Semitic have hastened to emphasize that much criticism of Israel is neither anti-Semitic
nor illegitimate. 
123
B. Governmental Response
1. The Office for Civil Rights
The 1964 Act establishes a remedial system to enforce the promise of equal pro-
tection. This system relies upon three pillars: private party litigation in the federal
" Tobin, supra note 64, at 35.
120 See, e.g., Brian Klug, The Myth ofthe New Anti-Semitism: Reflections onAnti-Semitism,
Anti-Zionism and the Importance of Making Distinctions, THE NATION, Feb. 2, 2004, at 23,
29, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040202/klug/5.
121 SCHOENFELD, supra note 21, at 144-46.
122 Alan M. Dershowitz, Making the Case for Israel, FRONTPAGE MAG, June 1, 2004,
http://www.frontpagemag.con/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID= 13590.
123 See, e.g., PHYuIJsCHESLER, THENEwANTI-SEMrISM:THE CURRENT CRISIS AND WHAT
WE MUST Do ABOUT IT 163-68 (2003) (endorsing criticism of Israel's treatment of women,
Arabs, and religious minorities, while arguing that much anti-Zionism is also anti-Semitic);
FOXMAN, supra note 32, at 195 (distinguishing anti-Semitism from "opposition to Israeli pol-
icies and actions" and asserting that "[p]rincipled, fair criticism of Israel and Israeli leaders
is always permissible").
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courts, United States Department of Justice enforcement in the federal courts, and ad-
ministrative enforcement in executive agencies such as the United States Department
of Education's Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"). Private party litigation is important
because the federal government never has provided sufficient resources to pursue all
anti-discrimination cases within its jurisdiction 2 4 and because federal agencies, by
their nature, seldom push the boundaries of the law as aggressively as private parties
and public interest advocacy groups are free to do. Justice Department enforcement
is also important because actions undertaken by that department-and even the pros-
pect of potential action by that department-have an impact vastly disproportionate to
the limited number of "pattern or practice" or public interest cases actually prosecuted.
OCR administrative action is arguably the most critical pillar of civil rights en-
forcement at educational institutions. The primary reason for this is that the Justice
Department's jurisdiction in education matters is principally limited to public univer-
sity desegregation cases and intervention in pending civil rights litigation of significant
public importance, while OCR has jurisdiction over virtually all other federal civil
rights cases involving education. 125 For this reason, OCR processes approximately
five thousand cases per year, an extraordinary share of the total national civil rights
124 See, e.g., U.S. COMM'N ON CIvIL RIGHTS, FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT: THE PRESIDENT'S 2006 REQUEST (2005), available at http://www.usccr.gov/
pubs/crfund06/crfund06.pdf; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FUNDING FEDERAL CIviL
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT: 2005, at 6-8 (2004), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/crfund05/
crfund05.pdf; U.S. COMM'N ON CiVIL RIGHTS, FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCE-
MENT: 2004, at 6-8 (2003); U.S. COMM'N ON CIvILRGHTS, FUNDING FEDERALCIVILRIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT: 2000-2003, at 2-5 (2002); U.S. COMM'N ON CiviL RIGHTS, FUNDING
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT: 2000 and Beyond (2001), available at http://www
.usccr.gov/pubs/crfundOl/chl .htm; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVILRGHTs, FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT (1995).
125 There are two situations in which the DOJ may exercise jurisdiction over cases involving
discrimination on the basis of religion in colleges or universities. Under Title IV of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Attorney General is authorized to initiate legal proceedings for relief
from discrimination on the basis of religion
[w]henever the Attorney General receives a complaint in writing...
that [a student] has been denied admission to or not permitted to con-
tinue in attendance at a public college by reason of race, color, religion,
sex or national origin, and the Attorney General believes the complaint
is meritorious.., and that the institution of an action will materially
further... desegregation in public education.
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (2000).Under another provision,
[wihenever an action has been commenced in any court of the United
States seeking relief from the denial of equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment ... on account of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin, the Attorney General ... may intervene ... if the
Attorney General certifies that the case is of general public importance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-2 (2000).
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caseload involving educational institutions. 26 Given the discretionary nature of DOJ's
jurisdiction in this area and the costs of private party litigation, a determination by
OCR to decline assertion of jurisdiction frequently constitutes a death sentence for
potential civil rights claims.
For most of its history, OCR pursued a practice of non-enforcement of civil rights
claims alleging anti-Semitic harassment. This practice was based upon a longstand-
ing OCR determination-inconsistently communicated and applied-that no statute
within OCR' sjurisdiction prohibits discrimination against or harassment of Jewish stu-
dents. Specifically, the traditional understanding at OCR was that Title VI protections
do not extend to Jews. OCR's justification for this position was articulated during the
Carter administration as follows: "any attempt to characterize discrimination against
Jews as racial in nature would be contrary to the intent of Congress to exclude religious
discrimination from Title VI protection as well as inconsistent with the weight of social
science and anthropological scholarship regarding racial and nationality groupings.' 27
While some officials deviated from this position from time to time, no formal policy
asserting anti-Semitism jurisdiction was issued until 2004.
In 2004, OCR issued a series of policy statements announcing that it would assert,
for the first time, jurisdiction to pursue claims alleging harassment of Jewish students. 28
These statements were issued as part of broader guidance concerning "complaints of
race or national origin harassment commingled with aspects of religious discrimination
against Arab Muslim, Sikh, and Jewish students."' 29 They were issued, interestingly,
in the course of determining an appropriate disposition for a case alleging harassment
against a Sikh student. 30 At the same time, they were issued in the belief that a uni-
form policy should apply to members of all groups exhibiting both religious and ethnic
or racial characteristics.
On September 13, 2004, OCR issued a public "Dear Colleague" letter informing
recipient institutions of its new enforcement approach.' 3' This guidance letter, issued
to over 20,000 colleges, universities, public school districts, and state education de-
partments, 32 announced OCR's decision to "exercise its jurisdiction to enforce the
Title VI prohibition against national origin discrimination, regardless of whether the
groups targeted for discrimination also exhibit religious characteristics" and thus
"aggressively investigate[] alleged race or ethnic harassment against Arab Muslim,
Sikh and Jewish students."'' 33 With this guidance letter, OCR publicly announced for
126 OCRANNUALREPoRT 2004, supra note 5, at 2-3. This extraordinary caseload is admini-
stered through twelve regional offices and OCR's Washington, D.C., headquarters. Id. at 3.
127 HEW-OCR, supra note 3.
128 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
129 2004 OCR Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5.
130 Eli Lake, Harassment of Jewish Students on Campus on the Rise Since 9/11, U.S. Aide
Asserts, N.Y. SUN, Nov. 15, 2004, available at http://www.nysun.com/article/4773.
13' 2004 OCR Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5.
132 Lake, supra note 130.
133 2004 OCR Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 5.
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the first time that it would enforce Title VI to protect Jewish students (and, for that
matter, Sikh students) against harassment. Nevertheless, questions still remained as
to OCR's commitment to using Title VI even in cases in which the Jewish student
asserted no racial or ethnic discrimination other than discrimination on the basis of
the student's status as a Jew.
OCR resolved that question in a policy letter issued to the Institute for Jewish and
Community Research (1CR) in late 2004 and subsequently publicly distributed. 34
The 11CR asked whether, for purposes of extending civil rights protections, "'Jewish'
may be interpreted as an ethnic [or],. . . racial category . . . even if the alleged
victims are Caucasian and American born."'35 OCR answered in the affirmative,
relying upon Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb136 and Saint Francis College v.
Al-Khazraji. 137 In those cases, the U.S. Supreme Court held that anti-Jewish and anti-
Arabic discrimination are barred by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibition on racial
discrimination in the formation of contracts and enjoyment of property. 38 The
Court reasoned that the term "race" (ironically not contained in the original statute)
was understood broadly in 1866 to encompass many ethnic and ancestral groups,
including Jews and Arabs, who are not understood today to constitute distinct racial
categories. ' The 1JCR letter stated that
the United States Supreme Court, has already answered in the
affirmative and in analogous statutory contexts your question...
The question here, of course, is not whether 'Jewish' is a racial or
national-origin category per se, but whether anti-Jewish incidents
may be covered within Title VI's broad protections against racial
or ethnic discrimination.... OCR recognizes that anti-Semitic
harassment may include adverse action taken against individuals
based on a victim's ethnic background or ancestry, notwithstand-
ing the prospect that such harassment may constitute religious dis-
crimination as well. In short, OCR recognizes that Title VI covers
harassment of students of Jewish heritage regardless of whether
the students may be Caucasian and American born. OCR cannot
turn its back on victims of anti-Semitism on the grounds that Jew-
ish heritage may include both religious and ethnic characteristics.
13 IJCR Letter, supra note 5, at 1.
135 Id.
136 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
117 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
138 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
131 Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617; Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at
610-11.
140 IJCR Letter, supra note 5, at 1.
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The new policy has been applied for the first time in the pending OCR inves-
tigation of the incidents at the University of California at Irvine. 4' In October 2004,
the Zionist Organization of America's Center for Law and Justice ("ZOA") filed a
complaint with OCR alleging that Jewish students at UC-Irvine had been subjected
to anti-Semitic harassment in violation of Title VI.142 ZOA detailed the Irvine inci-
dents described above, as well as many other allegations by students stretching over
a period of several years. 43
UC Irvine publicly responded to the ZOA's complaint with a frontal assault on
the 2004 OCR Policy, insisting boldly that "Title VI does not apply to allegations of
anti-Semitism."' 44 UC Irvine reasoned that "religion is not a protected class for pur-
poses of Title VI.' 141 Moreover, UC Irvine argued that Shaare Tefila held only that
"Jewish" constitutes a "race" only for purposes of § 1982. 14 The Court "specifically
rested its holding on the fact that when the Civil Rights Act of 1866, of which § 1982
is a part, was enacted, 'Jews... were among the peoples then considered to be distinct
races and hence within the protection of the statute. ' 147 By 1964, UC Irvine notes,
"race theory had developed dramatically," and Jews were no longer considered a
race.148 Moreover, UC Irvine argues that Congress's inclusion of religion in Title VII
of the 1964 Act "indicates that had Congress desired to also make religion a protected
class under Title VI, it knew that it needed to do so specifically."' 49 UC Irvine also
denies that it has discriminated against any student.'50
ZOA responded, inter alia, that Jews are a protected class under Title VI as both
a religious minority and a national origin group. ZOA conceded that the term "'reli-
gion' is not expressly included in the language of Title VI" but nevertheless argued
that "the legislative history of the statute suggests that Congress intended that re-
ligious discrimination be included....' In support of this counter-intuitive theory,
ZOA cited a substantial number of sources that include religious discrimination in a
recitation of discriminatory grounds prohibited by Title VI.'52 ZOA also argued that
141 Susan B. Tuchman, Using Federal Law to Fight Israel Bashing and Anti-Semitism on
Campus, ST. LOUIS JEWISH LIGHT, May 12, 2006, http://www.stljewishlight.comi/
commentaries/285120863955917.php.
142 Id.
143 id.
144 CAMpus ANTI-SEMITISM, supra note 8, at 16 (statement of Ms. Geocaris).
145 id.
'4 Id. at 16-17.
14' Id. at 17.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
'' Transcript, of U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, supra note 91, apps. 70, 81 (Letter from
Susan B. Tuchman to Kenneth L. Marcus, Staff Dir., U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights (Mar.
20, 2006)).
152 Id. apps. 81-82.
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Jews are protected under the broad interpretation that some lower courts have given
to the term "national origin."'
' 53
The UC Irvine matter remains pending before OCR. In the author's view, how-
ever, the legal arguments advanced by both parties are incorrect for reasons that will
be explained below.
2. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights
On April 3, 2006, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights issued its Findings and
Recommendations regarding Campus Anti-Semitism, which strongly reinforced the
2004 OCR policy. 5 4 In particular, the Commission found that these incidents,
"[w]hen severe, persistent or pervasive ... may constitute a hostile environment for
students in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."'15 The Commission,
over the objections of its Chairman, called upon the Department of Education to "pro-
tect college students from anti-Semitic and other discriminatory harassment by vigor-
ously enforcing Title VI against recipients that deny equal educational opportunities
to all students."' 1
56
In the course of deliberations, however, several fault lines became apparent. First,
some commissioners questioned the jurisdictional basis for pursuing anti-Semitism
claims under Title VI. "' Second, the new OCR chief issued correspondence that some
have interpreted as puffing back from the 2004 policy. 51 In light of this apparent con-
fusion, the Commission called upon Congress to clarify to the Department of Education
that Title VI does indeed protect Jewish students from anti-Semitic harassment. 
51
UI. ANTI-SEMMSM AND TITLE VI
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of
"race, color, or national origin" in federally funded programs or activities, including
most colleges and universities.l" Title VI does not explicitly prohibit discrimination
... Id. apps. 82-83.
151 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 1.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2.
157 Jacobson, supra note 7.
158 See Clyne, supra note 6.
159 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 2.
"60 Specifically, the statute provides that "[n]o person... shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity" covered by Title VI. Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 252, 252 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(2000)). It authorizes federal agencies "to effectuate the provisions of section 601 ... by issuing
rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability," id. § 602,42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l, and the
DOJ, in an exercise of this authority, promulgated a regulation forbidding funding recipients
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on the basis of religion, even though (i) prior versions of the legislation would have
prohibited religious discrimination16' and (ii) the 1964 Act elsewhere prohibits re-
ligious discrimination in other contexts.' 62 To what extent, then, does Title VI prohibit
discrimination against Jewish students in federally funded educational programs and
activities? Is UC Irvine correct that this issue should turn on whether Jews were under-
stood to constitute a "race" when Title VI was enacted in 1964? Is ZOA correct that
the 1964 Act tacitly prohibits all religious discrimination in all educational programs
and activities funded by the federal government? Or is the OCR correct in deter-
mining that Title VI prohibits anti-Semitic harassment as a form of racial (or national
origin) discrimination, subject to a limited exception for anti-Semitic animus directed
exclusively at the tenets of Jewish religious faith?
A. Anti-Semitism as Racism
1. The Supreme Court: Saint Francis College and Shaare Tefila
The Supreme Court unanimously decided Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji163
and Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb'64 on the same day, establishing simulta-
neously that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 protects both Arabs and Jews against racial discrimina-
tion in the making of contracts and enjoyment of property. 65 In St. Francis College,
to "utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals
to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin." 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2)
(2006). OCR regulations provide that:
A recipient under any program to which this part applies may not, di-
rectly or through contractual or other arrangements, on ground of race,
color, or national origin:
(i) Deny an individual any service, financial aid, or other benefit
provided under the program;
(ii) Provide any service... or other benefit to an individual which
is different, or is provided in a different manner, from that provided to
others under the program;
(iv) Restrict an individual in any way in the enjoyment of any ad-
vantage or privilege enjoyed by others receiving any service, financial
aid, or other benefit under the program;
(vi) Deny an individual an opportunity to participate in the program
through the provision of services or otherwise or afford him an oppor-
tunity to do so which is different from that afforded others under the
program ....
34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (2006).
161 See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
162 See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
163 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
'64 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
165 In so doing, the Court resolved a circuit split in which the courts of appeals had
[Vol. 15:837
ANTI-ZIONISM AS RACISM
an Iraqi-born Arab American professor sued the college that had denied him tenure,
arguing that the college had discriminated against him on racial grounds in violation
of § 1981. L66 The Supreme Court decided the case by examining the history of § 1981,
going back to the 1866 Act to determine "what groups Congress intended to protect"
in 1866.167 In so doing, the Court considered both legislative debate and contempo-
raneous literature. As the Court found, "[t]he [legislative] debates are replete with
references to" Jews, Scandinavians, Chinese, Mexicans, Gypsies, blacks, Mongolians,
and Germans as members of separate races. 168 The Court noted that this was consis-
tent with common mid-nineteenth century usage of the term "race," as demonstrated
by countless dictionaries and encyclopedias of that era. 169 The Court held, "[b]ased
on the history of § 1981, ... that Congress intended to protect from discrimination
identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely
because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.' 170 As the Court emphasized,
"[s]uch discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to
forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modem scientific
theory.''7 In an important footnote, the Court also stated that, under its prior cases,
"discrimination ... on the basis of ancestry violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."' 172
extended § 1981 protection to Arabs but not Jews. Compare Shaare Tefila Congregation v.
Cobb, 785 F.2d 523,527 (4th Cir. 1986) (finding that "discrimination against Jews is not racial
discrimination"), rev'd, 481 U.S. 615 (1987), with A1-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College, 784
F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that discrimination against Arabs violates the § 1981
prohibition against racial discrimination), aftfd, 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
'66 481 U.S. at 606. Section 1981, deriving in pertinent part from the 1866 Act, provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, pen-
alties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). Interestingly, § 1981 does not actually use the word "race." In Runyon
v. McCrary, however, the Court held that this section prohibits all "racial" discrimination in
contracting. 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976). This holding shifted the debate, fortuitously enough,
from the even more emotionally loaded question as to whether Arabs, Jews, and other groups
are sufficiently "non-white" to merit protection under § 1981.
167 Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 612-13. Specifically, the Court examined the legis-
lative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Voting Rights Act of 1870 because § 1981
is based on both statutes. Id.
168 Id. at 612.
169 Id. at610-11.
170 Id. at 613.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 613 n.5 (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954); Hurd v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24, 32 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
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In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, the Court applied its St. Francis College
holding to Jews, ruling that the 1866 Act's prohibition on racial discrimination applies
to Jews, since Jews are a "race" within the meaning of that statute. 7 3 In that case, a
Jewish congregation sued vandals under § 1982 for racial discrimination, after the
defendants spray-painted anti-Semitic messages on the walls of their synagogue.'74
Applying the St. Francis College analysis, the Court held that to make a claim under
§ 1982 one must allege that "defendants' animus was directed towards the kind of
group that Congress intended to protect when it passed the statute."' 75 The Court,
however, announced its view that "[i]t is evident from the legislative history of the
section... that Jews and Arabs were among the peoples then considered to be distinct
races and hence within the protection of the statute."' 176 The Court concluded by add-
ing that "Jews are not foreclosed from stating a cause of action against other members
of what today is considered to be part of the Caucasian race."' 77
In both cases, the Court relied upon the intent of Congress in enacting the under-
lying statutes. Specifically, the Court asked the critical question: based on the history
of the statute, what are the "identifiable classes of persons" that "Congress intended
to protect from discrimination"? 78 It was in order to answer this question that the
Court examined legislative history and contemporaneous literature. Since Shaare
Tefila and St. Francis College, the Supreme Court has reiterated the rule in those cases
elsewhere, 79 and Jewish plaintiffs have successfully established standing to pursue
§ 1981 claims. 80 In interpreting other statutes, courts must ask the same question:
what are the classes of persons that Congress intended to protect?
' 481 U.S. 615 (1987).
174 Id. at 616. Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).
"' Shaare Tefila Congregation, 481 U.S. at 617.
176 Id. at 617-18.
177 Id. at 618.
178 Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987).
179 The Court, in determining that distinctions between Hawaiian natives and other Hawaiian
people constituted a suspect "racial" classification for the purposes of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment's voting rights protections, reiterated St. Francis College's basic holding in Rice v.
Cayetano: "In the interpretation of the Reconstruction era civil rights laws we have observed
that 'racial discrimination' is that which singles out 'identifiable classes of persons... solely
because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics."' 528 U.S. 495, 515 (2000) (omission in
original) (quoting Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 613).
180 See Sinai v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 3 F.3d 471,474 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1025 (1994); Singer v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1,959 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (D. Colo.
1997). At least one court has gone further, holding that Shaare Tefila, read together with
Saint Francis College, "protects Jews as a race" not only under the Reconstruction Era civil
rights statutes but also under the Thirteenth Amendment and under those contemporary civil
rights statutes passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment. United States v. Nelson, 277
F.3d 164, 177 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 835 (2002).
[Vol. 15:837
ANTI-ZIONISM AS RACISM
2. Legislative History
Focused primarily on the plight of African Americans, Congress in 1964 cast
little light on its intentions with respect to the scope of racial discrimination against
non-African Americans, the reasons for Title VI's omission of religious discrimi-
nation, or the extent of national origin protection. One point is, however, quite clear:
Congress intended to prohibit racial discrimination in federally funded programs
to the same extent as the prohibition contained in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
a. Emphasis on discrimination Against African Americans
The lengthy debates on the 1964 Act provide little legislative history on the issues
of anti-Semitism or, more broadly, on ethnic and religious discrimination, especially
with respect to Title VI.' The reason for this is simple and should be rather obvious
to even casual students of this period of American history: Congress was principally
concerned at this time with racial discrimination against African Americans. 8 2 While
Congress prohibited some forms of national origin, religious, and sex discrimination,
its primary concerns were elsewhere. This is confirmed by the House Judiciary
Committee's report discharging H.R. 7152 as well as by the statements of various
members of both the House and Senate during floor debate.
The House Judiciary Committee's report acknowledged discrimination against
"some minority groups" but identified discrimination against African Americans as
the principal motive for the bill. 83 Congressman Emanuel Celler, then-Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee and sponsor of the legislation, frequently reminded
the House during floor debate that discrimination against African Americans was the
prime motivator behind Title VI: "[Title VI] simply provides that, where Federal
money is used to support any program or activity-money which is paid into the
18 United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.
1972).
182 Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating "National Origin " Discrimination
Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 806 n.6 (1994).
183 The "General Statement" contained in House Report 914, reporting the House's
version of the 1964 Act to the full House, explained,
Most glaring ... is the discrimination against Negroes which exists
throughout our Nation. Today, more than 100 years after their formal
emancipation, Negroes, who make up over 10 percent of our population,
are by virtue of one or another type of discrimination not accorded the
rights, privileges, and opportunities which are considered to be, and must
be, the birthright of all citizens.
H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 18 (1963), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393.
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Treasury by Negro and white citizens alike-the program must be used for the bene-
fit of both races, without discrimination."'8
Celler's congressional colleagues in both chambers shared this abiding concern.
Congressman Roland Libonati, for example, stated that "[tihis section VI of the bill
is the enforcement section to eliminate all the prejudices practiced against the Negro
in the labor market, in the schools, on questions of relief and other questions."' 5 Sim-
ilarly, Senator John Pastore asked, rhetorically, "What will [Title Vi] accomplish? It
will guarantee that the money collected by colorblind tax collectors will be distributed
by Federal and State administrators who are equally colorblind."'86
This is not to suggest, of course, that Congress wholly disregarded other minority
groups or neglected to find facts of other forms of discrimination to support its legis-
lation. It is, rather, only to emphasize that the relatively slim legislative record on
some critical questions arises from the appropriate legislative focus that was placed
on discrimination against black citizens.
b. Incorporation of a constitutional standard
Notwithstanding this single-minded focus, the intent of Congress with respect
to the scope of Title VI's prohibition of racial discrimination is clear in one respect.
Members of both the House and Senate intended to apply the Fourteenth Amendment's
standards of racial discrimination to federal programs and activities that receive fed-
eral funds. As Justice Powell would later put it, writing for the plurality in Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke, Title VI evidenced "incorporation of a con-
stitutional standard."'
187
During floor debate, Senator Humphrey declared that the purpose of Title VI was
"to insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the
moral sense of the Nation."'' 8 In other words, "the bill bestows no new rights" and
only seeks "to protect the rights already guaranteed in the Constitution of the United
States, but which have been abridged in certain areas of the country."'89 Senator
Ribicoff agreed that Title VI embraced the constitutional standard: "Basically, there
is a constitutional restriction against discrimination in the use of Federal funds; and
title VI simply spells out the procedure to be used in enforcing that restriction. ' ' 90
110 CONG. REc. 1518 (1964).
185 Id. at 2469.
16 Id. at 7055.
"87 438 U.S. 265, 286 (1978).
.88 110 CONG. REc. at 6544. Senator Humphrey stated this point repeatedly. See, e.g., id.
at 13,442 ("Section 601 is a policy statement on constitutional law .....
89 Id. at 5252 (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
"9 Id. at 13,333. Senator Ribicoff also put it this way:
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Senators Claiborne Pell,' 9' John Pastore, 192 Gordon Allott,' 93 and Joseph Clark"9
made the same point during Senate debate. In the House, the point was also made
by Congressman Celler, House Judiciary Committee Chairman and floor manager
for the legislation. 95
If we are to eliminate discrimination, if we are to agree that discrimi-
nation is unlawful, and discrimination is also unconstitutional, then there
is no justification for the Federal Government continuing to pay Federal
funds to any organ of government... that continues to discriminate.
Title VI implements these basic principles. It provides a fair and rea-
sonable procedure for making sure that the Constitution is observed and
for making sure that discrimination in the use of Federal funds is ended.
Id.
191 Senator Claibome Pell asked rhetorically: "Is it not true that the philosophy of title VI
is already in the law? The authority is permissive. Title VI would merely extend it, but would
not bring in a new concept." Id. at 7064.
192 Senator John Pastore traced the provision to the Thirteenth Amendment:
[I]t is next to disgraceful for us to be appropriating money to promote,
preserve, and maintain a system that the Supreme Court of the United
States has said is absolutely unconstitutional.
We are assuming the position that we should have assumed when the
13th amendment to the Constitution, which freed the slaves, was ratified.
Id. at 7057.
193 Senator Gordon Allott argued, "where Federal funds go to support racially segregated
schools and other public institutions or activities, the result is that funds of the United States
are used to support and maintain a violation of the Constitution of the United States." Id. at
12,677.
"94 Senator Joseph Clark, like Senators Humphrey and Ribicoff, emphasized that the bill
would create no new rights distinct from those set forth in the Reconstruction Era amendments:
So I think the Record should show that there is very little basis in logic
or in law for the statement that the bill does not give rights to millions
of Americans which they do not now possess as a practical matter, but
which the Constitution quite clearly sets forth, in the 14th and 15th
amendments and the commerce clause and which they have a right to
expect their Federal Government to give to them.
Id. at 5243.
'9 Congressman Celler explained:
The bill would offer assurance that hospitals financed by Federal money
would not deny adequate care to Negroes. It would prevent abuse of food
distribution programs whereby Negroes have been known to be denied
food surplus supplies when white persons were given such food. It
would assure Negroes the benefits now accorded only white students in
programs of high[er] education financed by Federal funds. It would, in
short, assure the existing right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of
Federal funds.
Id. at 1519.
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c. The Fourteenth Amendment'
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has already indicated in dicta, without
discussion or analysis, that "discrimination... on the basis of ancestry violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."1 97 The Court's observation
is correct, but confirmation requires consideration of both the Amendment and the
1866 Act.
The text, structure, and history of the Fourteenth Amendment provide little direct
evidence to demonstrate the scope of its anti-discrimination provisions. As compared
to other Reconstruction Era civil rights legislation, floor debate on section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment includes few statements from which one might discern legis-
lative intent.' 98 Nevertheless, the record is clear on one point: "the broad language
of Section One [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was... widely understood [by its
framers] to encompass-that is, to be at least as broad as-the commands of the [1866
Act]."' 99 The co-extensiveness of Amendment and Act were made most plain by one
of its opponents, Representative Andrew Jackson Rogers, who remarked that, "[t]his
section... is no more nor less than an attempt to embody in the Constitution... that
outrageous and miserable civil rights bill." 2 ° In other words, just as the 1964 Act in-
corporates the full scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition on racial dis-
crimination, the Fourteenth Amendment in turn prohibits racial discrimination at least
to the full extent covered under the 1866 Act.
This is not entirely self-evident, as the language of the 1866 Act is very different
from that of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 ' Nevertheless, the 1866 Act has been
196 The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified July 9, 1868, provides in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment also provides Congress with the
"power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. § 5.
'9 Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,613 n.5 (1987) (citations omitted).
198 Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARv. L. REv. 1,47 (1955); Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of CivilRights Legislation,
50 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1330 (1952).
'99 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193, 1244(1992).
200 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2538 (1866).
201 In pertinent part, the 1866 Act provides as follows:
[C]itizens of the United States ... of every race and color, without
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
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regarded as "[t]he most concrete expression of the Framer's [sic] understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment,"2 2 deliberately fashioned to constitutionalize the 1866
Act (i) to provide constitutional support for the 1866 Act, (ii) to protect the 1866 Act
against the prospect of subsequent repeal, and (iii) to provide for more effective en-
forcement of the 1866 Act.203 In light of this history, it is clear that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended its scope to be at least as great as that of the 1866
Act-since the Amendment's purposes could not be achieved if its scope was any nar-
rower-and the only room for question has been whether the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment's anti-discrimination protection is equal to or broader than that of the
1866 Act.
20 4
One of the principal motivating factors leading to the framing of the Fourteenth
Amendment was a congressional desire "to provide an incontrovertible constitutional
foundation" for the 1866 Act.205 The 39th Congress had passed the 1866 Act largely
under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment.2 °6 Many members believed that
the Thirteenth Amendment provided adequate constitutional support for the Act.207
Senator Lyman Trumbull, for example, argued that "[d]epriv[ing] any citizen of civil
rights which are secured to other citizens, is an unjust encroachment upon his lib-
erty; and is, in fact, a badge of servitude which, by the [newly enacted Thirteenth
Amendment to the] Constitution is prohibited. '28 Representative M. Russell Thayer
convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and per-
sonal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
202 Rebecca E. Zietlow, Juriscentrism and the Original Meaning of Section Five, 13 TEMP.
POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REv. 485, 505 (2004).
203 See generally Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863 (1986) (arguing that the legislative
history shows an understanding that civil rights were a national issue and need to be enforced
by the national government).
204 For example, Alexander Bickel argued that Section One is broader because it deals not
only with racial discrimination but also with other forms of discrimination. Bickel, supra note
198, at 60.
205 AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTrrUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 362 (2005).
206 The Thirteenth Amendment, ratified December 6, 1865, provides in pertinent part:
"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Amendment also provides Congress
with "the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Id. § 2.
207 Zietlow, supra note 202, at 501.
201 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866).
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elaborated that "[t]he [Thirteenth] amendment to the Constitution gave liberty to all;
and in giving liberty it gave also a complete exemption from the tyrannical... laws
which belong to the condition of slavery, and which it is the object of this bill forever
to remove.
20 9
Other members maintained that Congress's power to enforce civil rights laws was
inherent in the Constitution, irrespective of the Thirteenth Amendment. Representative
William Lawrence, for example, argued that
Congress may by law secure the citizens of the nation in the
enjoyment of their inherent right of life, liberty, and property, and
the means essential to that end, by penal enactments to enforce
the observance of the provisions of the Constitution, article four,
section two, and the equal civil rights which it recognizes or by
implication affirms to exist among citizens of the same State.2"'
Many members of Congress disagreed, as did President Andrew Johnson, particu-
larly in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Dred Scott.21' Congressman John Armor
Bingham, later the principal draftsman of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment,
doubted the 1866 Act's constitutionality, arguing that
[t]he Constitution does not delegate to the United States the power
to punish offenses against the life, liberty, or property of the citizen
in the States nor does it prohibit that power to the States, but leaves
it as the reserved power of the States, to be by them exercised.212
Congress was required to override President Johnson's veto by a two-thirds majority,
the first time that it had done so in American history. Despite the strength of this
support for the Act, doubts remained about its constitutionality, even among some
congressmen who were strongly supportive of its aims. In short, Republican congress-
men were concerned that the courts would interpret the amendment to merely abolish
slavery, rather than to establish a broader array of rights to ensure that the newly liber-
ated slaves would not be hampered by the badges of slavery.2 13
Congressman Bingham was among those who strongly supported the goals of the
1866 Act, but constitutional concerns led him to vote against it.214 Intent upon secur-
ing the Act's constitutional foundations, Bingham became a principal supporter of
209 Id. at 1152.
210 Id. at 1835.
2' Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
212 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866).
23 Kaczorowski, supra note 203, at 910.
214 William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously: A Call to Expand the
Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV. 153, 185 (2002).
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what became the Fourteenth Amendment. As Professor William J. Rich has observed,
Bingham's "central role in promulgating the Fourteenth Amendment reflected his
drive to eliminate all doubts regarding congressional power."'215 Bingham argued that
the Amendment would authorize Congress to enforce "'the rights which were guar-
antied ... from the beginning, but which guarantee has been unhappily disregarded
by more than one state of this Union ... simply because of want of power in Congress
to enforce that guarantee.'
21 6
Many supporters of the 1866 Act who believed that it was constitutional never-
theless supported enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to allay any remaining
doubts.2"7 Representative Thomas D. Eliot expressed this perspective:
I voted for the civil rights bill, and I did so under a conviction
that we have ample power to enact into law the provisions of
that bill. But I shall gladly do what I may to incorporate into the
Constitution provisions which will settle the doubt which some
gentlemen entertain upon that question.2" 8
Other congressmen agreed with Representative Eliot, joining in his call to provide
greater constitutional fortitude for the 1866 Act.219 In short, a consistent refrain among
members of the 39th Congress was that a constitutional amendment was necessary
to strengthen the support for the 1866 Act, either because the Act was not sufficiently
supported by the existing Constitution or because others might later erroneously claim
that it was unconstitutional.
A second and similar motivation was to ensure that the 1866 Act would not be
repealed when Southern Democrats returned to Congress.220 As Representative James
A. Garfield explained:
The civil rights bill is now a part of the law of the land. But every
gentleman knows it will cease to be a part of the law whenever
the sad moment arrives when [the Democratic] party comes into
power. It is precisely for that reason that we propose to lift that
great and good law above the reach of political strife, beyond the
reach of the plots and machinations of any party, and fix it in the
215 Id.
216 Zietlow, supra note 202, at 503 (omissions in original) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1866)).
217 Kaczorowski, supra note 203, at 910.
218 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2511 (1866).
29 See, e.g., id. at 1088 (statement of Rep. Frederick E. Woodbridge) (arguing that most
of the civil rights work "may be done by legislation.... But the experience of this Congress
in that regard has been most unfortunate"); id. at 2465 (statement of Rep. Martin R. Thayer)
("[I]n the estimation of this House [the 1866 Act] cannot be sustained as constitutional.").
220 Kaczorowski, supra note 203, at 910.
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serene sky, in the eternal firmament of the Constitution, where no
storm of passion can shake it and no cloud can obscure it.221
Similarly, some members may have been concerned that some courts were refus-
ing to enforce the 1866 Act on constitutional grounds.222 In fact, as Professor Eugene
Gressman pointed out, some courts challenged the constitutionality of the 1866 Act,2
23
although others affirmed it.224 For this reason, the Amendment was thought to provide
a necessary bulwark against judicial activism.
It is clear, then, that Congress's enactment of section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended, in significant measure, to provide a firmer constitutional
protection for the rights defined in the 1866 Act. Since the Amendment was intended
to support the Act, it stands to reason that the scope of its protections could not be nar-
rower than the scope of the statutory provisions that rest upon it. The constitutional
basis for the 1866 Act-whether it be the Thirteenth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment-must therefore provide protections against racial discrimination that
are at least as broad as those contained in the 1866 Act, and those broad protections
(including protections against anti-Semitism) are therefore incorporated into the 1964
Act as well.
3. Analysis: Anti-Semitism as Racial Discrimination
The most significant legal challenge facing efforts to combat campus anti-Semitism
has been the argument that discrimination on the basis of "race," as it is defined within
the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, does not apply to discrimination against
Jews. This argument has an emotional edge to it, of course, because racialist concep-
tions of Jewishness have a particularly odious pedigree. After St. Francis College and
Shaare Tefila, the argument has been articulated as follows: anti-Jewish discrimi-
nation may be considered racial discrimination under the 1964 Act only if Jews were
considered to constitute a race in 1964, just as anti-Jewish discrimination is consid-
ered racial discrimination under the 1866 and 1870 Acts225 only because Jews were
considered a race during 1866-70. The body of evidence demonstrating that Jews
were no longer considered to constitute a separate racial group in 1964 is as formi-
dable as the body of evidence demonstrating that they were so considered in 1866.226
221 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2462 (1866).
222 Gressman, supra note 198, at 1328.
223 Id. at 1328 & n. 19(citing People v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198 (1870); Bowlin v. Commonwealth,
65 Ky. (1 Bush) 5 (1867)).
224 Id. at 1328 n.18 (citing United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785 (C.CD. Ky. 1866)
(No. 16,151); People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658 (1869); Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299
(1866); In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); Hart v. Hoss & Elder,
26 La. Ann. 90 (1874)).
225 See supra note 199 for text of the Act.
226 See, e.g.,13 CoLLiER's ENCYCLOPEDIA 569 (1964) ("A common error and persistent
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This is the main reason that the Office for Civil Rights rejected anti-Semitism claims
until 2004.227 This approach is, however, based upon an erroneous interpretation of
both the 1964 Act and the St. Francis College and Shaare Tefila cases.
Given the intent of the framers of the 1964 Act, the scope of racial discrimination
prohibited in 1964 is based upon the scope of the Reconstruction Era civil rights legis-
lation. The scope of racial discrimination prohibited under the 1866 and 1964 Act is
identical because both statutes bar racial discrimination to the same extent authorized
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court repeatedly
and correctly recognized that the scope of racial discrimination barred under Title VI
is coextensive with that which is prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause and
the Fifth Amendment. 2 8 This holding is based upon the documented intent of legis-
lators to ensure that federal funds are not used in a manner that violates constitu-
tional requirements.229
Under the alternative approach, basic civil rights statutory terms such as "race,"
"religion," and even "sex" should be defined differently for each anti-discrimination
statute in which they appear. In order to determine the scope of protection provided,
it would be necessary to analyze the manner in which the terms were used as of the
date of the bill's passage. This is in part a project for the history of anthropology and
related social sciences. Under the St. Francis College analysis, however, it is not
merely a matter of social scientific history. Because the St. Francis Court has taught
us that "race" is no mere anthropological concept-but may in fact be a socio-political
construct-the task of statutory interpretation under this approach requires a socio-
political analysis of the construction of race in each historical period in which
modem myth is the designation of the Jews as a 'race."'); 16 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA
119-20 (1964) ("Jews have always been racially mixed, having absorbed individuals and
groups of many races throughout their long history.... Anthropologists disagree about the
racial continuity of the modem Jews with their Palestinian ancestors.").
227 See supra note 5.
228 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 n.23 (2003) ("We have explained that dis-
crimination that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment committed
by an institution that accepts federal funds also constitutes a violation of Title VI."); see also
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,280-81 (2001) (noting that § 601 of the regulations im-
plementing Title VI "'proscribe[s] only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal
Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment"' (alteration in original) (quoting Regents of Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,287 (1978)); United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732, n.7
(1992) ("Our cases make clear, and the parties do not disagree, that the reach of Title VI's pro-
tection extends no further than the Fourteenth Amendment." (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("In view of the clear legislative
intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate
the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment."))); Bakke at 327 (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (declaring that Title
VI, "merely extends the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment to private parties who re-
ceive federal funds.").
229 See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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Congress has legislated on the subject. Moreover, it could be argued that socio-
political trends are sufficiently mutable that racial conceptions may evolve even within
historical periods as brief as the Reconstruction and Civil Rights Era. Indeed, it has
been argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that the concept of race changed so rapidly be-
tween the 1866 Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 as to exclude Jews from the pro-
tection of anti-racial discrimination legislation only five years after the 1866 Act was
passed.23 This approach would render the scope of civil rights protections as mer-
curial as the socio-political trends underlying our various conceptions of group iden-
tities. This approach would also, ironically, provide a far lower degree of protection
than would the Court's originalist approach because the scope of racial anti-discrimi-
nation law would contract, as the scope of that term has historically become more
narrow. This over-stringency runs counter to the doctrine that anti-discrimination laws
should be construed broadly to effectuate their remedial purpose.
In sum, the legislative history of the pertinent statutes and amendments dem-
onstrates that Title VI must provide the same broad protection against anti-Semitic
harassment in federally funded programs and activities that the 1866 Act established
in the context of contracts and property.
B. Anti-Semitism as National Origin Discrimination
As an intuitive matter, many policy-makers would prefer to bar anti-Semitism as
a form of national origin discrimination because that category appears, at first blush,
to approach most closely the common understanding of Jews as an ethnic group. In
fact, the legal basis for barring anti-Semitism as a form of national origin discrimina-
tion is much shakier than the ground for barring it as a form of racial discrimination.
Although this area of the law is unsettled, at least one district court has held (in an
unpublished memorandum opinion) that Jews do not constitute a national origin group
under Title VII,23" ' but a couple of others have held that they do.23 2 This reflects the
current tension that exists, more generally, with respect to the scope of "national origin"
protection. Some lower courts have extended "national origin" broadly to include,
e.g., gypsies,233 Serbs,23 Cajuns,235 and Ukrainians... at times when these groups have
not held independent nations. Such courts have relied upon various ancestral or ethnic
230 Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 is the parent of § 1985. See United States v.
Nelson, 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002).
23' Lapine v. Edward Marshall Boehm, Inc., No. 89-C-8420, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3459
(N.D. I11. Mar. 28, 1990). This unpublished opinion provides only a brief, perfunctory dis-
cussion of the issue and cannot be considered persuasive.
232 Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Va. 1984); Compston v. Borden, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
233 Janko v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 704 F. Supp. 1531, 1532 (N.D. I11. 1989).
234 Pejic v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 840 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1988).
235 Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F. Supp. 215 (W.D. La. 1980).
236 Kovalevsky v. West Publ'g Co., 674 F.Supp. 1379 (D. Minn. 1987).
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features to establish "nationality": physical characteristics, 237 language,23 distinct cul-
ture, surnames, 24 documented history of the group's existence,24' physiognomically
distinct characteristics, 2 42 and even predominant religion.24 3 Some of these traits could
form the basis of an argument that American Jews form a national origin group. Simi-
larly, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has defined national origin
discrimination to "includ[e], but not [be] limited to, the denial of equal employment
opportunity because of an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or be-
cause an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national
origin group. '  Such a broad construction of "national origin" could be used to pro-
hibit anti-Semitism.
On the other hand, the single Supreme Court case to analyze "national origin"
within the meaning of the 1964 Act, Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., inter-
preted the term very narrowly. 245 In Espinoza, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
clothing company's policy of restricting its hiring to United States citizens constituted
national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII.246 The Court, noting the ab-
sence of significant legislative history on this issue, held that Title VII only protected
U.S. citizens from discrimination.247 When specifically addressing the national ori-
gin issue, Justice Marshall noted that national origin "on its face refers to the country
where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her an-
cestors came.,
248
The legislative history of the 1964 Act provides little guidance. As Juan Perea has
noted, since Congress's principal concern in enacting the 1964 Act was with race,
"national origin" was likely included as "boilerplate," since it had previously been
included in executive orders and prior legislation.249 Congress provided similarly
sparse illustration of the scope of Title VI's prohibition on national origin discrimi-
nation. Chairman Celler provided one of the few pertinent explanations during an
exchange on the House floor with Congressman Thomas Gerstle Abemethy. 20 At
237 United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24, 25 (E.D. Tex. 1971).
21' Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
239 Texas, 342 F. Supp. at 25-26.
240 Id. at 26.
241 Roach v. Dresser Indus. Valve & Instrument Div., 494 F. Supp. 215,217 (W.D. La. 1980).
242 Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 608 (1987).
243 Texas, 342 F. Supp. at 25.
244 29 C.F.R § 1606.1 (2006).
245 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
246 Id. at 87.
247 Id. at 88-89.
248 Id. at 88.
249 Perea, supra note 182, at 807. While Professor Perea's comments are directed specifi-
cally towards Title VII, they are no less true with respect to Title VI.
250 110 CONG. REC. 1528 (1964).
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that time, Chairman Celler suggested that the inclusion of "national origin" into
Title VI was intended to address discrimination against Puerto Ricans:
Mr. ABERNETHY.... Now what national origin-what group
of that character have been discriminated against?
Mr. CELLER. There were discriminations mentioned concern-
ing certain groups like Puerto Ricans.
Mr. ABERNETHY. They were not discriminated against then
because of color?
Mr. CELLER. Well, they were discriminated against because of
national origin.25" '
During Senate floor debate, Senator James Eastland complained that the bill left
terms like "national origin" undefined and ambiguous:
There is no definition of "national origin." Each Federal depart-
ment or agency is given carte blanche to define these words as
it may determine by "rule, regulation, or order." Federal po-
litical appointees in the executive departments will invent their
own definitions and make their own rules. They will devise their
own penalties.252
In sum, the legislative history sheds little light on what Congress intended by its
inclusion of "national origin" in Title VI.
If this Court should address this issue in the future, it will find a significant tension
between its Espinoza precedent on the one hand and the direction that the lower courts
and the EEOC have taken on the other. Given the broad scope of "race" discrimination
under the 1964 Act, the resolution of the "national origin" issue should be immaterial
to the anti-Semitism question. However, it should be observed that establishing pro-
tection under the "national origin" classification will be a more difficult hurdle than
under the "race" classification, in light of the differing approaches of Shaare Tefila
and Espinoza.
C. Anti-Semitism as Religious Discrimination
Susan Tuchman has argued that Title VI prohibits religious discrimination, even
though Congress omitted the term "religion" from the prohibited bases of discrimi-
nation listed in Title VI.253 Interestingly, Ms. Tuchman' s argument is supported by a
wide range of authorities that have listed "religion" among the forms of discrimination
251 Id.
252 Id. at 5863.
253 Tuchman, supra note 141.
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that Title VI prohibits. These discussions, however, invariably occur in dicta, un-
supported by any form of analysis, and appear in context to be simple error. The leg-
islative history of Title VI demonstrates that Congress intentionally refrained from
prohibiting religious discrimination in educational institutions in order to permit
religious institutions to select their own faculties and students.
1. The Argument for Tacit Prohibition
Tuchman argues that the legislative history of Title VI demonstrates both con-
gressional concern about religious discrimination and a congressional intent to elimi-
nate religious discrimination.' In fact, she correctly notes that at least one Senator
stated that Title VI would prohibit religious discrimination. Indeed, as she observes,
numerous courts have similarly indicated that Title VI prohibits religious discrimina-
tion."' However, every one of these references appears in dicta, unaccompanied by
any reasoning or analysis and appears to be a simple misstatement, just as Senator
Ervin's statement appears to be a simple error. The term "religion" is simply included
by rote in a boilerplate list of discriminatory bases that people assume, incorrectly,
must have been barred by Title VI. As a basic rule of statutory construction, when
"'Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten-
tionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.' 25 6 In this case,
254 Id. Tuchman relies in part upon then-Senator Sam Ervin's statement that "'the dis-
crimination condemned by [Title VI] occurs only when an individual is treated unequally or
unfairly because of his race, color, religion, or national origin."' Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,338 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Senator Ervin).
255 See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) ("[V]ictims of dis-
crimination on the basis of... religion... have had private Title VI remedies available...
since 1965 ... ."); Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684,691 (3d Cir. 1982), superseded
by statute, Civil Right Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28, as
recognized in Radcliff v. Landau, 883 F.2d 1481 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of l964... proscribes discrimination by reason of... religion .... ); Carmi v. Metro.
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 679 n.11 (8th Cir. 1980) (McMillian, J., concurring)
("Title VI prohibits discrimination based on... religion...."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892
(1980); Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev't Auth., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1167 (D. S.D. 2002)
("[Title VI] prohibits the exclusion of anyone in a federally-assisted program on account of
... religion .... "), afftd, 342 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2003).
Similarly, President Clinton's Executive Order (Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Race,
Sex, Color, National Origin, Disability, Religion, Age, Sexual Orientation, and Status as a
Parent in Federally Conducted Education and Training Programs) states that "discrimination
on the basis of ... religion ... [is prohibited] under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act[] of
1964 ...... Exec. Order No. 13,160, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,775 (June 27, 2000).
256 Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522,525 (1987) (quoting Russello v. United States,
464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)).
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Congress did not merely omit "religion" from Title VI, while including it in Title IV,
Title VII, and elsewhere. In fact, Congress deliberately stripped "religion" from the
legislation. While Congress's precise purpose in stripping this probation from the
bill may be debated, it is clear that it did so deliberately.
2. Deletion of Religion
The primary congressional intent in stripping religious discrimination from Title
VI appears to have been concern over the ability of denominational institutions to dis-
criminate in favor of co-religionists in academic admissions, choir, and employment.
The original version of the statutory language that became Title VI, drafted by the
Department of Justice,257 explicitly prohibited religious discrimination.258 However,
the Committee on the Judiciary deleted the prohibition on religious discrimination
from what became Title VI. The Committee report provides no explanation for the
deletion of religion from what was to become Title VI. Here is what happened. After
four months of hearings, Subcommittee No. 5 of the Judiciary Committee adopted
a substitute amendment replacing entirely the substantive text as proposed by the
DOJ.29 Among other substantial changes, this substitute version did not include the
term "religion" in Title VI. The full Committee on the Judiciary, in its reported
version, accepted the subcommittee's recommendation and reported the bill to the
full House.26
There is little legislative history to explain this decision by Subcommittee No. 5.
Even House Report 914, reporting H.R. 7152 to the full House, does not discuss the
change, though the report does discuss other substantive changes the Subcommittee and
257 110 CONG. REc. 2462 (1964).
258 Section 601 originally provided as follows:
Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any law of the United
States providing or authorizing direct or indirect financial assistance for
or in connection with any program or activity by way of grant, contract,
loan, insurance, guaranty, or otherwise, no such law shall be interpreted
as requiring that such financial assistance shall be furnished in circum-
stances under which individuals participating in or benefiting from the
program or activity are discriminated against on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin. All contracts made in connection
with any such program or activity shall contain such conditions as the
President may prescribe for the purpose of assuring that there shall be
no discrimination in employment by any contractor or subcontractor on
the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
S. 1731, 88th Cong. § 601 (1963) (emphasis added); see also 109 CONG. REc. 11,252 (1964)
(introducing H.R. 7152 by Congressman Celler, Chairman of the House Committee on the
Judiciary).
259 See H.R. REP. No. 88-914, pt. 1, at 16-17 (1963), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2391, 2391-92.
260 See 110 CONG. REc. 2462-65 (1964).
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the full Committee made to the proposed text.261' Discussion on the omission of the
term "religion" from Title VI is also omitted from the views of Judiciary Committee
members included alongside the full Judiciary Committee report.262
On January 31, 1964, H.R. 7152's sponsor, Congressman Celler, explained during
floor debate that he had been concerned about permitting denominational colleges to
engage in certain forms of discrimination in favor of co-religionists:
There may be employees in a denominational college where it
is required that people of certain faith do the particular kind of
work that is required-and that is somewhat in the nature of dis-
crimination if the authorities would only have those of a certain
faith, consistent with the faith that dominates that college ....
Therefore, they have to discriminate in favor of those of their
religion.263
The following week, during floor debate, Congressman Celler amplified upon
this explanation:
The clergy who testified accepted and stated they supported fully
this bill with religion omitted.
By eliminating religion, we avoid a good many problems
which I am sure the gentleman understands. The aid now goes to
sectarian schools and universities. Local sectarian welfare groups,
I am sure you will agree, do an excellent job. There is no religious
discrimination, of course, among them.
For these reasons, the subcommittee and, I am sure, the full
committee or the majority thereof deemed it wise and proper and
expedient-and I emphasize the word "expedient"-to omit the
word "religion. ' ' 6
This explanation is a plausible one and fully explains the congressional decision
to strip "religion" from the bill. It may have been difficult, however, for some mem-
bers to explain why they had stripped such a core provision from the legislation and
whether they were placing the interests of parochial institutions above the civil rights
of certain religious minorities.
A complete discussion of this legislative history must acknowledge that legislators
also identified an additional justification for the omission, perhaps to assuage concerns
261 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 88-914 (1963), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391.
262 See, e.g., id. pt. 2, at 1-27, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2487-513 (additional views on H.R.
7152 of Hon. William M. McCulloch et al.).
263 110 CONG. REC. 1528 (1964).
264 Id. at 2462.
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that their primary justification may have caused, although their secondary explanation
is far less persuasive. Congressman Celler contended somewhat mysteriously-and
manifestly counter to the evidence-that Congress had obtained little evidence of
religious discrimination:
We had testimony concerning religion. We did not have very
much testimony of discriminations on the grounds of religion.
You will notice in one of the titles, religion is left out.
We had very little evidence-I do not think we had any of it
insofar as the Committee on the Judiciary is concerned that any
particular sect or religion had been discriminated against.
26
Surprisingly, Congressman Peter Rodino, Jr., agreed with Celler' s contention during
floor debate:
[T]here is a specific reason why religion was left out of title VI.
There was no evidence that there was a need to include religion
on the question of discrimination.
Various members of the clergy of the different faiths appeared
before the committee and testified that religious discrimination
was not a question. We attempted to meet the problems as they
arose. As a result, we did not include religion.2 6
Rodino and Celler supported this argument with testimony that Subcommittee
No. 5 received from Father John Cronin, Associate Director of the Social Action
Department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and Rabbi Irwin Blank,
Chairman of the Commission on Social Action, Synagogue Council of America.
Father Cronin had testified that he did not believe that the term "religion" should
be included in the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
There are remnants of religious discrimination in the United States,
but compared to the instant problem before us, of the civil rights of
the Negro community, these are very, very minor and peripheral
and I would not have any feeling that this should be broad-
ened .... [T]he amount of religious discrimination in say, em-
ployment, public accommodations is very, very slight.... It is
almost a matter of private injustice or private wrong rather than
anything that involves public law.267
265 Id. at 1528.
266 id.
267 Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within the Jurisdiction
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During floor debate, Congressman Peter Rodino read part of this particular statement
into the record to support his argument that religious discrimination was not pervasive
and that the term "religion" should be omitted from Title VI.
26
I don't believe that need is very pressing at this time. There are
remnants of religious discrimination in the United States, but com-
pared to the instant problem before us, of the civil rights of the
Negro community, these are very, very minor and peripheral and
I would not have any feeling that this should be broadened; no.269
When Congressman George Meader asked Rabbi Blank for his opinion regarding
the omission of "religion" from various parts of the legislation, Blank responded:
It would be my impression along with Father Cronin that those
agencies in Jewish life which have taken on the responsibility of
dealing with questions of anti-Semitism and discrimination have
been reporting of late a very significant decline in this kind of
religious discrimination.... I do not think of this as being a sig-
nificant omission at this point.270
If this testimony was truly the basis for the deletion of "religion" (as opposed to
a pretext concocted to ensure political support), it raises several questions. For in-
stance, despite Father Cronin and Rabbi Blank's testimony, the Judiciary Committee
retained the term "religion" in fifteen other places within its reported version of H.R.
7152.271 Celler explained that this was because the Committee found "elements of
discrimination based on religion [as applied in other titles], so it was deemed wise to
include 'religion' in those other titles" in contrast to the need for it to appear in Title
VI.272 Discussion of these "elements," however, does not appear within Subcommittee
No. 5's published hearing record and was not explained during floor debate. More-
over, it is entirely implausible that the Judiciary Committee found that enforcement
mechanisms were needed to ensure that religious discrimination did not perpetuate
unlawful segregation (Title VI) but that it was not a problem in federally funded in-
stitutions generally.
Moreover, this alleged paucity of religious discrimination in programs that
receive federal funding conflicts directly with evidence presented to the House of
of the United States: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 2030 (1963) [hereinafter Subcommittee No. 5 Hearings].
268 110 CONG. REC. 1529 (1964).
269 Subcommittee No. 5 Hearings, supra note 267, at 2030.
270 Id. at 2031.
27 110 CONG. REc. at 2462.
272 Id.
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Representatives Committee on Education and Labor during the same period.273
Notably, testimony in that committee's General Subcommittee on Labor regarding
the existence of discrimination against those of Jewish ancestry was being heard at
approximately the same time Subcommittee No. 5 was finding that no religious dis-
crimination existed.274 During three months in 1963, the General Subcommittee on
Labor heard testimony from Jewish leaders and various state officials that discrimina-
tion against those of the Jewish faith was rampant in the nation's employment and
other practices-including, among those agencies and programs that receive federal
funding. 5
The Special Subcommittee on Labor was presented, for example, with a 1954 sur-
vey of the Anti-Defamation League, which reported discrimination against Jewish
graduates in higher education job placement offices.276 A representative from the
American Jewish Congress broadly concluded that "there is of course a continuing
pattern of discrimination, that is, particularly among Negroes but, without surprise,
among Jews as well. 277 The Subcommittee also heard testimony that between 1953
and 1960, the President's Committee on Government Contracts reported that 23.4%
of complaints received were based on "creed," which at least one expert attributed to
the "Jewish religion. 278 A review of the records of Subcommittee No. 5's proceed-
ings indicates that this evidence of discrimination based on Jewish ancestry was not
presented during the course of the Subcommittee's fact-finding when it drafted the
substitute version of Title VI.
279
2173 The General Subcommittee on Labor's hearings were conducted in consideration of
H.R. 405, "A Bill to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment in Certain Cases Because of
Race, Religion, Color, National Origin, Ancestry or Age." To Prohibit Discrimination in
Employment in Certain Cases Because of Race, Religion, Color, National Origin, Ancestry,
or Age: Hearing on H.R. 405 and Similar Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the H.
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Subcommittee on LaborHearings].
At least one scholar has argued that H.R. 405 was the "nominal ancestor" to what became Title
VII of H.R. 7152. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDuS. & CoM. L.
REv. 431, 433 (1966).
274 The General Subcommittee on Labor (then considering H.R. 405) heard testimony re-
garding the existence of religious discrimination on May 7, 1963. See, e.g., Subcommittee
on Labor Hearings, supra note 273, at 116-22. By contrast, Subcommittee No. 5 heard testi-
mony from clergy regarding the virtual nonexistence of religious discrimination on July 24,
1963-less than three months later. See, e.g., Subcommittee No. 5 Hearings, supra note 267,
at 2030-31. The apparently irreconcilable nature of the testimony considered by both sub-
committees appears unexplained in the Congressional Records and other sources.
275 See, e.g., Subcommittee on Labor Hearings, supra note 273, at 116-22.
276 See Proposed Federal Legislation to Prohibit Discrimination in Employment in Certain
Cases Because ofRace, Religion, Color, National Origin, Ancestry, Age or Sex: Hearings Before
the Spec. Subcomm. on Labor of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 87th Cong. 585 (1961).
277 Subcommittee on Labor Hearings, supra note 273, at 122.
278 Id. at 119.
279 See generally Subcommittee No. 5 Hearings, supra note 267.
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In short, Congress's apparent purpose in deleting "religion" was to permit re-
ligious institutions to discriminate in favor of co-religionists. This was an understand-
able concern, and it also underlies religious institution exceptions to various other civil
rights laws. It may be, however, that this congressional (and constitutional) interest
was controversial in 1964 as in fact it has remained controversial to this day, as the
competing claims of religious liberty and civil rights protections continue to play out
in a variety of contexts. Some members proffered the alternative rationale that a ban
on religious discrimination was not needed in light of the decline in that problem in
the years leading up to 1964.280 This explanation, though, is questionable in light of
both the number of times that religious discrimination is addressed elsewhere in the
1964 Act (where it would not pose a threat to parochial schools) and also the conflict-
ing evidence then before Congress, showing at least some basis for the proposition
that Congress was aware in 1964 of the continuing problem of religious discrimination
in federally funded educational institutions.
3. Analysis: Viability of the Religious Discrimination Exception
The prohibition of anti-Semitic discrimination, subject to an exception for discrim-
ination based solely upon the tenets of religious faith, comports with the legislative
history of the 1964 Act. In light of the clear legislative intent to strip "religion" from
Title VI, the contrary authorities may be dismissed as being simple errors. Senator
Ervin's mistake is understandable in light of the bill's evolution, and the courts' errors
are similarly understandable in light of the inclusion of religion in so many other
antidiscrimination statutes.28'
On the other hand, the sheer frequency with which the courts have listed religion
among the prohibited bases of discrimination may suggest a deeper point. To begin
with, it confirms Professor Perea's point that Congress was so focused on the plight
of African Americans that its inclusion of non-racial categories, such as national origin
or religion, was often a matter of "boilerplate," based on the established legislative habit
of listing in civil rights legislation more or less the same "usual suspect" classifications,
if the pun may be excused, although the classifications were described in different
ways from time to time.28 2 This legislative sloppiness, while initially disconcerting,
becomes less significant when one realizes that the listing of prohibited discrimina-
tory bases was not intended to create specific new rights to protection from, say, racial
or national origin discrimination.283 Rather, Congress's goal merely was to provide
an enforcement mechanism to protect those rights that had been established a century
before in the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes and amendments without exceed-
ing the scope of that legislation in a manner that could impair the religious liberties
280 See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
281 See supra note 271.
212 Perea, supra note 182, at 806-07.
283 See supra Part II.A.2.b-c.
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of faith-based educational institutions." This understanding confirms Congress's
intent to apply the new enforcement mechanism to ban from federally funded educa-
tional institutions the various forms of discrimination prohibited under, for example,
the 1866 Act, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, including
anti-Semitic harassment, subject to a limited, legislatively implied exception for dis-
crimination that is based exclusively on religious faith.
This point is not intuitively obvious. The question under Shaare Tefila is: what
identifiable classes did Congress intend to protect?;. 5 it certainly gives one pause
to see that at least some members of Congress seriously considered and deliberately
rejected statutory language that would have provided Title VI protection to religious
minorities, explicitly including Jewish students. At the same time, Congress's de-
cision not to provide this additional protection does not in any way vitiate their man-
ifest intent to protect racial minorities from racial discrimination to the full extent
established under the Reconstruction Era Amendments. To this extent, Congress's tacit
determination to extend only racial discrimination protection to Jews and not religious
discrimination protection results only in the situation that the Title VI anti-Semitism
bar necessarily has an exception for discrimination that is strictly religious in animus.
Another implication of the courts' frequent confusion on this matter is that the
exclusion of religion is counter-intuitive because it does not sit well with the structure
of the statute as a whole. Indeed, it is difficult to fully reconcile the religious discrimi-
nation exception with congressional intent to prevent government funding of unconsti-
tutional discrimination. In a sense, the religious discrimination exception remains one
bit of unfinished business left over from the 1964 Act. To the extent that this "loop-
hole" remains open, it cannot be maintained that Congress has fully achieved its pur-
pose, as Senator Humphrey put it, "to insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance
with the Constitution and the moral sense of the Nation. ,286 Ironically, this purpose
could be achieved, with careful draftsmanship, in a manner that permits religious edu-
cational institutions to select faculty and students to the same extent that they are able
under existing law. A legislative solution to close this loophole would appear appro-
priate but is beyond the scope of this Article.2"7
ml1. ANTI-SEMITISM, HARASSMENT AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Under what circumstances does anti-Semitic harassment constitute a Title VI vio-
lation? Having established that anti-Semitic incidents may be covered under Title VI,
284 See supra Part II.A.2.b-c.
285 Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615,617 (1987) ("The question before us
is whether, at the time § 1982 was adopted, Jews constituted a group of people that Congress
intended to protect.").
286 110 CONG. REc. 6544 (1964).
287 For a discussion of this legislation proposal, see Kenneth L. Marcus, The Most Important
Right We Think We Have but Don't: Freedom from Religious Discrimination in Education,
7 NEv. L.J. 171 (2007).
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it remains to describe the circumstances under which they are covered. In this con-
text, two questions are typically raised. The first is whether the recent incidents have
been sufficiently severe to merit federal intervention. The second is whether the First
Amendment may protect some of the conduct which is alleged to violate Title VI.
A. The Scope of Title VI Harassment
The Supreme Court has held that "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive"
student-on-student harassment may be actionable when it has a "concrete, negative
effect" on a student's "ability to receive an education. ' 88 This standard, developed
in the context of sex discrimination in the public schools, applies equally to other forms
of discrimination in federal programs and activities, including ethnic discrimination
in post-secondary education.8 9 While this standard may be difficult to apply on a case-
by-case basis, the difficulties are not unique to anti-Semitism cases; all harassment
cases, particularly in the student-on-student context, raise practical difficulties in appli-
cation. Anti-Semitism is no exception. Nevertheless, it is clear that this standard is
a stringent one-more stringent than is commonly recognized-and that a substantial
pattern of hostile behavior must be shown to demonstrate a violation. 9°
This judicial standard, it must be observed, varies significantly from OCR's
current standard. Under OCR's harassment standard, unchanged since Davis, the
Education Department will find a violation if an institution
has created or is responsible for a racially hostile environment-
i.e., harassing conduct (e.g., physical, verbal, graphic, or written)
that is sufficiently severe, pervasive or persistent so as to interfere
with or limit the ability of an individual to participate in or benefit
from the services, activities or privileges provided by a recipient.29'
The Court's Davis standard ("severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive") differs
from OCR's standard ("severe, pervasive or persistent") particularly with respect to
288 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 653-54 (1999).
289 Both courts and agencies have generally articulated the standards for the different cate-
gories of harassment in the same terms and have purported to apply them in the same manner.
See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
n. 1 (1997) ("The principles involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion or national
origin."). This is not to say, however, that the standards are always applied in the same man-
ner, as others have observed that this is not always the case. Heather L. Kleinschmidt, Note,
Reconsidering Severe or Pervasive: Aligning the Standard in Sexual Harassment and Racial
Harassment Causes of Action, 80 IND. L.J., 1119, 1124-30 (2005).
290 See Davis, 526 U.S. at 859-60.
291 Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational Institutions;
Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 11,448, 11,449 (Mar. 10, 1994) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Racial Incidents Guidance].
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the substitution of conjunctive for disjunctive. In other words, seven years after Davis,
OCR has not revised its regulations to reflect the Supreme Court's determination
that a hostile educational environment requires not merely severe or pervasive mis-
conduct, but also conduct that is sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offen-
sive as to deny a student an equal educational opportunity.292
The most significant ramification of this distinction appears with respect to
"single-instance" episodes of harassment, an important category in that it likely
covers many of the recent, lower-profile anti-Semitic incidents on college campuses.
292 Under conventional analysis, one might conclude that OCR must correct this discrepancy
in order to conform its enforcement activities with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title
VI. Administrative agency deviations from binding judicial precedent, when deliberate, are
typically characterized as "administrative agency nonacquiescence." During the 1980s, this
practice was frequently analyzed by legal commentators. See Dan T. Coenen, The Constitu-
tional Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 n.4 (1991)
(listing over thirty law review articles and notes addressing various forms of nonacquiescence
from 1982 to 1991). Most courts and commentators have been critical of the practice. Id. The
newer school of decision rules constitutional analysis may, however, provide a somewhat dif-
ferent perspective on the practice. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996
Term-Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, Ill HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997) (discussing
the role of precedent in the content and process of constitutional doctrine which is implemented
in the context of institutional needs); Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How
the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655-67 (2005) (describing the
decision rules model). Under the decisions rules model, one would distinguish between the
two outputs ofjudicial implementation: operative propositions, which interpret the meaning
of laws, and decision rules, which provide directives to lower courts regarding how the opera-
tive propositions should be applied. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90
VA. L. REV. 1 (2004) (distinguishing operative propositions from decision rules). In Davis,
one might identify the operative proposition as the Court's determination that Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972 prohibits federally funded programs and activities from
deliberately ignoring student-on-student sexual harassment. Davis, 526 U.S. at 643. The Davis
decision rule-requiring that the harassment be severe, pervasive, and sufficiently objectively
offensive, id. at 653-54---may be construed as a judicially manageable standard to implement
the operative proposition in money damages cases. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially
Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1297-313,
1317 (2006). Such decision rules, however, may be based on the judiciary's own "institutional
considerations" unrelated to the meaning of the legal provision. Berman, supra, at 95 (citing
decision rules that "seem patently motivated by institutional considerations"). Assuming that
executive agencies must defer to the judiciary's interpretations of the meaning of laws, see
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), it is not clear that agencies must apply
the same decision rules implemented by the judiciary, particularly when, as in Davis, those
rules underenforce the underlying legal norms. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1220-28 (1978)
(discussing the legal status and direct consequences of "judicially underenforced constitutional
norms"). Whether OCR should apply the same decision rules as the courts may depend on
a host of factors, such as OCR's own institutional considerations as well as its assessment
of the likelihood that its cases will end up in an Article III court. A complete discussion of
this topic would, of course, exceed the scope of this Article.
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Although this issue has been addressed most notably in the context of sexual harass-
ment, the issue is identical in the context of racial and ethnic discrimination. OCR has
stated-both before and after Davis-that "a single or isolated incident of sexual ha-
rassment may, if sufficiently severe, create a hostile environment." '293 This claim,
however, was rejected by the Davis Court, which observed that,
[a]lthough, in theory, a single instance of sufficiently severe one-
on-one peer harassment could be said to have such an effect, we
think it unlikely that Congress would have thought such behavior
sufficient to rise to this level in light of the inevitability of student
misconduct and the amount of litigation that would be invited by
entertaining claims of official indifference to a single instance of
one-on-one peer harassment.294
Notwithstanding OCR's doctrinal deviation, hostile environment must be understood
(at least since Davis) to require multiple incidents in order to be "severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive. 295
Following Davis, campus anti-Semitism will rise to the level of a Title VI vio-
lation only on those rare occasions when the incidents on a particular campus are as
severe as we have seen during the most notorious episodes, when the conduct per-
vades the life of the university, and when it is so objectively offensive as to diminish
educational opportunities for at least one Jewish student. Even then, the university
must be on notice of the problem and fail to take adequate steps to remedy it.296
Although this is a highly stringent standard, it does have real teeth. OCR' s decision
to assert jurisdiction in the UC Irvine case, for instance, necessarily implies (under
OCR's investigative rules) OCR's preliminary determination that the facts alleged,
if true, are sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., that ZOA had properly
alleged hostile environment discrimination at Irvine.297 A similar determination would
surely have been made at San Francisco State, had OCR's 2004 policy been in place
in 2002, absent President Corrigan's swift and exemplary response to the problem on
298his campus. Whether a Title VI case could be made at Columbia University is a
harder question, as the facts there are harder to establish, despite the attention gar-
nered in the wake of Columbia Unbecoming.29
293 See, e.g., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP'T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD
PARTIES 6 (2001), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf.
294 Davis, 526 U.S. at 652-53; Racial Incidents Guidance, supra note 291, at 11,449.
295 Davis, 526 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added).
296 Id. at 643-44.
297 See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP'T OF EDUC., OCR CASE RESOLUTION AND
INVESTIGATIVE MANUAL § 104 (2005), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/
docs/ocrcrm.html (elaborating OCR's subject matter jurisdiction).
298 See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
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B. Anti-Semitic Harassment and the First Amendment
Those who resist campus anti-Semitism enforcement initiatives often argue that
campus anti-Semitism may amount to constitutionally protected free speech or expres-
sions of academic freedom.300 The invocation of First Amendment arguments in anti-
Semitism cases, disproportionately to the invocation of such arguments in analogous
sex, race, or disability cases, reflects, in part, the frequency with which anti-Semitism
has recently been intertwined with political speech, although it may also reflect the
use of double standards.
To the extent that campus anti-Semitism raises First Amendment3' or academic
freedom issues, they largely mirror those raised by racial, national origin, sexual and
disability harassment law. 30 2 As Eugene Volokh has noted, "[rieligious harassment
law is structurally almost identical to racial and sexual harassment law: both punish
speech when it's 'severe or pervasive' enough to create a hostile, abusive, or offensive
work environment based on religion, race, or sex, for the plaintiff and for a reasonable
person., 313 The same, surely, can be said of anti-Semitic harassment under Title VI:
it raises precisely the same issues as anti-black, anti-Hispanic, anti-female, or anti-
disability harassment under either Title VI or similar anti-discrimination laws, no more
and no less. The counter-argument here is that the "harassment" at issue here, if any,
is merely political, not racial or religious. In other words, the question is whether en-
forcement of Title VI in cases of alleged anti-Semitic harassment may chill legitimate
speech. Here again, the answer is that First Amendment issues arise in anti-Semitism
cases in precisely the same manner as in race, ethnicity, sex, or disability cases, al-
though they may be raised disproportionately often for various reasons.
As a foundational matter, federal anti-harassment policies are subject to the same
potential claim that they are unconstitutional under the First Amendment when applied
to anti-Semitism as to racist, sexist, or anti-disability harassment.3° In all of these
cases, it is true that (i) the Supreme Court has not yet directly reached the issue;30 5
" See, e.g., Ruth Contreras et al., Position Paper on Anti-Semitism in Academia, SCHOLARS
FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, Mar. 20,2003, http://www.spme.net/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?ID
=32 ("Anti-Semitism has become commonplace once more in mainstream academic settings
in classrooms and extracurricular affairs with tacit approval from many university officials,
who assert that such discourse is protected as academic freedom and need not be treated as hate
speech."). This statement was adopted by Scholars for Peace in the Middle East. Id.
301 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech ... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
302 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Religious Harassment Law, and Religious
Accommodation Law, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 57, 57 (2001).
303 Id.
304 Id.
303 Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Law and the First
Amendment: Can the Two Peacefully Coexist?, 12TEX.J. WOMEN &L. 67,68-69 (2002) (spe-
cifically referencing the relationship between the First Amendment and sexual harassment).
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(ii) the Supreme Court has shown no inclination to address the issue;306 and (iii) find-
ing anti-harassment law unconstitutional would overturn more than twenty years of
legal development, 37 not just in education law, but also in employment, housing and
other areas.
This foundational issue has, however, been the subject of considerable litigation 308
and scholarly interest.3" Harassment law imposes content-based restrictions on var-
ious forms of speech,310 and such restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional.31 '
These laws might be defended on several grounds, including that they are narrowly
3' Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the FirstAmendment
Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 9-12.
307 Kirshenbaum, supra note 305, at 70. It is also true, of course, that the opposite holding-
i.e., that there are no First Amendment limits whatsoever on campus speech and harassment
codes-would similarly sweep away quite a bit of case law. See, e.g., Iota XI Chapter of Sigma
Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 393 (4th Cir. 1993) (applying First
Amendment protections to a fraternity's "ugly woman contest" and holding a university cannot
selectively limit speech); Roberts v. Haragan, 346 F. Supp. 2d 853, 867-73 (N.D. Tex 2004)
(striking down portions of a campus speech code on First Amendment grounds); UWM Post,
Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (applying First
Amendment doctrines of overbreadth, fighting words, and vagueness to a campus speech
code); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 861-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (applying vague-
ness and overbreadth doctrine to a campus speech code); see also Lee Ann Rabe, Note, Sticks
and Stones: The First Amendment and Campus Speech Codes, 37 J. MARSHALLL. REv. 205,
225-27 (2003). For a defense of campus speech rights, see Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of
Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate Speech, 75 MiNN. L. REV.
933, 941-44 (1991).
308 See, e.g., Vega v. Miller, 273 F.3d 460,464,466-71 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535
U.S. 1097 (2002) (finding that a sexual harassment policy did not violate a professor's free
speech rights); Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 1999)
(upholding a hostile environment award in the face of a First Amendment challenge),
overruled as recognized in Haberman v. Hartford Ins. Group, 443 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir.
2006); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding a
college sexual harassment policy unconstitutional as applied on First Amendment grounds),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1140 (1997). See generally Kirshenbaum, supra note 305, at 68, 69
& n.8 (noting the increase in litigation over sexual harassment issues).
309 See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, Zero Tolerance for the First Amendment: Title VII's
Regulation of Employee Speech, 27 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 563 (2001); Fallon, supra note 306;
Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and
Sexual Harassment, 68 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1003 (1993); Sherry, supra note 307; Rabe,
supra note 307.
30 Browne, supra note 309, at 563-64; Gerard, supra note 309, at 1004; Kirshenbaum,
supra note 305, at 67.
31 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). OCR policy is to interpret ha-
rassment law in a manner that averts potential violations with the First Amendment. See Letter
from Gerald A. Reynolds, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Office for Civil Rights to
Colleague (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/firstamend
.html. The author had a hand in the preparation of this letter.
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tailored means of achieving a compelling governmental interest; i.e., they survive
strict scrutiny. Alternatively, to the extent that harassment laws are construed to reach
no further than the "fighting words" doctrine under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire312
or to curb imminent incitement to violence under Brandenburg v. Ohio,313 they may
be defended under those precedents. In Grove City College v. Bell,314 the Court re-
jected a private college's claim that conditioning federal funds on its compliance with
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 violated the First Amendment.31 5 In-
deed, the Court found that this argument "warrant[ed] only brief consideration" be-
cause "Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal
financial assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept. '316 The
Court concluded that no First Amendment violation had occurred-without reviewing
the substance of the First Amendment claims-because Grove City could decline the
government's funds.317
In application, anti-Semitic harassment has various features in common with other
forms of harassment, including its ability to yield easy cases. Few would argue that
the rock allegedly thrown at a Jewish student at UC Irvine was constitutionally pro-
tected even if it was, as it appears, used moments before as a paperweight for anti-
Israeli political literature.318 Similarly, the threats and intimidation alleged at several
campuses are no more protected as a result of the anti-Zionist political discourse with
which they are interspersed. 3 9 The hurling of cinder blocks through Hillel windows
may be intended to express a political opinion, but it is nevertheless a form of conduct
prohibited by content-neutral laws of general applicability. Even the scrawling of
swastikas, protected under some circumstances, is not protected when used to deface
university property.32 Given the detailed allegations of physical intimidation and
312 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
313 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969).
314 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
315 Id. at 575-76.
316 Id. at 575.
317 Id. at 575-76.
318 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
319 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 586, 572 (1942) (discussing fighting words
in an analogous case that did not involve anti-Semitism). Conversely, it may be argued that the
anti-Zionist political discourse is no less protected as a result of the threats and intimidation
with which they are interspersed, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)
(finding threats interspersed with otherwise non-violent, permissible assembly were not pun-
ishable by the state), subject of course to the limits of Brandenburg and Chaplinsky.
320 This use of swastikas has become something of a varsity sport in recent years. To
mention a few instances, swastikas were "carved into a residence hall bulletin board" at the
University of Colorado at Boulder (March 2005), "carved into the freshly poured concrete"
at Atlantic Cape Community College in New Jersey (April 2005), drawn on "[plosters
advertising a Chicago Friends of Israel event" at the University of Chicago (May 2005), and
etched in acid on a campus caf6 table top and drawn in a dormitory at the University of
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assault that occur in the incendiary environment that now exists on some campuses,
it is rather vacuous (if not untrue) to insist that the First Amendment protects the polit-
ical speech with which these incidents are interspersed. Those who would defend the
recent outbreak of campus anti-Semitism on those grounds are rather like the man
who shouts "First Amendment!" in a burning building.
CONCLUSION
Judea Pearl may have been right and the United Nations wrong in at least one
respect: it may truly be anti-Zionism that is racism after all.322 Specifically, it is
racism in the technical sense that it constitutes "racial discrimination" prohibited by
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and it does so only when it is in fact a guise
for anti-Semitic bigotry so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies
some students the rights that all should enjoy equally. It is an unfortunate irony in
today's much-trumpeted "golden age" of Jewish college life323 that the world's oldest
continuous bigotry should erupt just when many had thought it extinguished at long
last. Particularly ironic is its reappearance in precisely the places where it should be
most unwelcome. Although federal anti-discrimination law is a rather blunt instru-
ment for addressing such matters, it can be an effective one when properly utilized.
The severest cases of anti-Semitic harassment rise to a level requiring prompt and
decisive action, and Title VI provides an available means for their resolution.
Oregon (October 2005). Press Release, Anti-Defamation League, Annual ADL Audit: Anti-
Semitic Incidents Decline in 2005 but Levels Still of Concern in U.S. (Apr. 5, 2006), http://
www.adl.org/presrele/asus_12/audit_2005.
32 See, e.g., supra Part I.A.4-7.
322 Judea Pearl, Anti-Zionism is Racism, ZIONISM ON THE WEB, http://www
.zionismontheweb.org/Anti-Zionism is racism.htm.
323 Seidler-Feller, surpa note 19.
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